"Do You Know What You Don't Know?" Exploring Monitoring Accuracy Across Domains of General Knowledge, Financial Calculation, and Probability Calculation by Dentakos, Stella
 
 
“DO YOU KNOW WHAT YOU DON’T KNOW?” EXPLORING MONITORING 
ACCURACY ACROSS DOMAINS OF GENERAL KNOWLEDGE, FINANCIAL 
CALCULATION, AND PROBABILITY CALCULATION* 
 
 
 
STELLA DENTAKOS 
 
 
 
 
A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO 
THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES 
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR THE DEGREE OF 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
 
GRADUATE PROGRAM IN CLINICAL DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY  
 
 
 
YORK UNIVERSITY 
TORONTO, ONTARIO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DECEMBER, 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Stella Dentakos, 2019 
 ii	
ABSTRACT 
 
Confidence and its accuracy have been most commonly examined in domains such as 
general knowledge and learning, with less study of other domains, such as applied knowledge 
and problem-solving. Monitoring accuracy in real-world competencies may depend on 
characteristics of the domain. The current study examined whether monitoring accuracy, both 
calibration (resistance to overconfidence) and resolution (discrimination) indices, are stable 
within individuals and across tasks that represent highly diverse areas. The well-established 
domain of general knowledge and two understudied applied domains of financial calculation and 
probability calculation were examined. In addition, correlations between monitoring accuracy 
and cognitive abilities (intellectual ability and working memory) and several aggregated 
judgments regarding each task as a whole (ratings of predicted and postdictive performance, task 
difficulty, and effort required), as well self-perceptions relating to test anxiety and academic self-
concept were explored. Calibration was significantly positively correlated across tasks, reflecting 
a person-centered trait, but not resolution. Cognitive abilities were predictive of both calibration 
and resolution across tasks, while other task-specific judgments and self-perception variables 
demonstrated varied and tasks specific associations. Monitoring accuracy was not predictive of 
real-world outcomes including academic average and learning challenges. Overall study findings 
support that when considering a wide range of domains, calibration displays domain-generality, 
while resolution displays domain-specificity.  
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1	
“Do you know what you don’t know?” Exploring monitoring accuracy across domains of 
general knowledge, financial calculation, and probability calculation 
The discrepancy between knowledge and metacognitive monitoring of one’s knowledge 
has been examined extensively in both the metacognition (Kleitman & Stankov, 2007; Koriat, 
2008, 2012a; Stankov, Kleitman, & Jackson, 2014) and in the judgment and decision-making 
(Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff, 2007; Parker & Fischhoff, 2005; Stanovich, West, & 
Toplak, 2016; Yates, Lee, & Bush, 1997; West & Stanovich, 1997) fields. Metacognitive 
monitoring represents a subjective assessment of how well a task has been, is, or will be 
performed (Ackerman & Thompson, 2017; Bjork, Dunlosky, & Kornell, 2013; Nelson & Narens, 
1980). Several indicators of monitoring accuracy have been used, including calibration and 
resolution, as detailed below. In addition to different methods for assessing monitoring accuracy, 
the nature of the domain examined may also impact accuracy (Erickson & Heit, 2015; West & 
Stanovich, 1997). In this study, calibration and resolution were examined within the classic 
domain of general knowledge and compared to additional domains that have been scarcely 
studied in this context despite being common in real-life scenarios: financial calculation and 
probability calculation. In addition, the question of domain generality versus specificity was also 
explored by examining whether calibration and resolution were related across these diverse 
domains. Cognitive abilities, represented by intellectual abilities and working memory, task-
specific judgments including predictive and postdictive confidence, task difficulty and effort 
ratings, as well as self-perceptions of academic self-concept and cognitive test anxiety, were 
explored as potential monitoring accuracy correlates in each of these domains. The relationship 
between monitoring accuracy and real-world outcomes of academic success and learning-related 
challenges were also examined.  
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Indices of Monitoring Accuracy 
Metacognition is traditionally defined as “thinking about thinking” (Flavell, 1979) or 
“knowing about knowing” (Metcalfe & Shimamura, 1995) and includes aspects of metacognitive 
monitoring and control (Schraw & Dennison, 1994). Metacognitive monitoring reflects the 
ability to evaluate current states of knowledge, such as judging that performance on a problem is 
poor. Metacognitive control refers to the ability to engage in regulation strategies, such as 
reworking the problem or double-checking calculations (Grainger, Williams, & Lind, 2016; 
Zabrucky, 2010). Metacognitive monitoring is not only thought to precede control, but to also 
dictate subsequent decision-making and effort regulation (Zabrucky, 2010). There are two ways 
that accuracy of metacognitive monitoring can be measured: calibration and resolution.  
Calibration. Calibration represents the degree of fit between subjective feelings of 
certainty or correctness about one’s answer, known as confidence judgments, and the objective 
accuracy of such judgments (Keren, 1991). The more closely overall confidence judgments 
match success rates, the better calibrated the individual is considered to be. Calibration is viewed 
as a measure of precision, assessing whether a specific confidence judgment matches 
performance exactly (Schraw, 2009). Calibration is therefore considered to be a measure of 
absolute accuracy.  
Poor calibration can happen in both directions, including overconfidence and  
underconfidence. Overconfidence occurs when confidence judgments are greater than actual 
performance and this bias reflects a failure to detect errors (e.g., being confident in an incorrect 
response; Pallier, Wilkinson, Danthir, Kleitman, Knezevic, Stankov, & Roberts, 2002; Rinne & 
Mazzocco, 2014). In contrast, underconfidence occurs when confidence judgments are lower 
than actual performance and reflects the false detection of errors (e.g., lacking confidence in 
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correct responses; Pallier et al., 2002; Rinne & Mazzocco, 2014). Calibration has a direct impact 
on reasoning and decision-making by regulating and directing subsequent behaviors. For 
example, if performance on a math problem is judged as poor, an individual will likely rework 
the problem or double-check calculations, in order to increase performance. However, if 
performance on the same problem is judged as satisfactory, further regulation strategies will not 
be initialized. Overconfidence can therefore lead to a false sense of mastery resulting in 
allocating less cognitive resources than required to solve a problem. In contrast, underconfidence 
can lead to unnecessary and continued allocation of resources to a problem. Well-developed 
calibration skills are therefore critical for effective resource allocation. Individuals however tend 
to be poor judges of their own knowledge state, such that both children and adults are likely to 
display biased confidence judgments, with a tendency towards over- rather than underconfidence 
(Bjork et al., 2013; Soderstrom, Yue, & Bjork, 2015; Stanovich, West, & Toplak, 2016). 
Overconfidence has also been found to exist cross-culturally, with some minor variations in the  
degree of overconfidence. For example, overconfidence in general knowledge has been found to  
be typically stronger among Asian participants, compared to Western participants (Yates, Lee, &  
Bush, 1997), although both groups display a general tendency towards overestimating  
performance.  
In the current study, participants indicated which response out of a possible four 
alternatives was correct and were then asked to assess their confidence in that response, on a 
scale from 25% (not confident at all, just guessing) to 100% (very confident). Resistance to 
overconfidence was equal to one minus the absolute difference between mean confidence and 
percentage correct across task items, such that higher scores reflected better performance (Bruine 
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de Bruin et al., 2007; see Method section for detailed description of calibration indices and 
corresponding formulas).  
Resolution. Resolution, also known as discrimination or relative accuracy, is another 
measure of metacognitive monitoring accuracy. Resolution indicators can be used to assess 
whether a person is able to discriminate between correct versus incorrect performance (Koriat, 
2012a) and are viewed as a measure of consistency (Schraw, 2009). Resolution is therefore 
considered to be a measure of relative, rather than absolute, accuracy.  
Resolution is important for guiding people to effectively choose which materials to invest 
additional effort in to make the best use of their time (e.g., Destan & Roebers, 2015; Thiede, 
Anderson, & Therriault, 2003). Using the same example as above, calibration can inform 
whether performance on a math problem is poor, whereas resolution will direct to which parts of 
the problem are in need of additional effort investment. As evidenced by this example, both 
calibration and resolution have different functions regarding metacognitive monitoring and their 
measures are dissociable. That is, in the same experimental paradigm, calibration might be high, 
while resolution might be low, or vice versa (Maki, Shields, Wheeler, & Zacchilli, 2005; see 
Thiede, Mueller, & Dunlosky, 2015, for a review). There are various ways of measuring 
resolution including the Pearson correlation coefficient, the Discrimination Index (Schraw, 
2009), the Goodman–Kruskal Gamma correlation (Nelson, 1984), and the confidence-judgment 
accuracy quotient (CAQ; Jackson & Kleitman, 2014). The choice of index depends on the 
literature (i.e., educational psychology literature versus decision-making literature), whether 
confidence judgments are elicited pre, during, or post task, and the design of the confidence 
judgment scale. Similar to other studies within the decision-making field, the current study 
measured resolution with the Goodman–Kruskal Gamma correlation. Gamma correlations 
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inform whether responses that receive greater confidence judgments are also the responses that 
result in greater performance and whether responses that receive lower confidence judgments are 
also the responses that result in poorer performance (Maki et al., 2005). Similar to the Pearson 
correlational coefficients a gamma value of “0” indicates a lack of relationship (i.e., lack of 
resolution) and greater values indicate stronger relationships (i.e., strong ability to discriminate 
between correct versus incorrect responses; see Method section for detailed description of 
resolution index).   
Thus, these two aspects of monitoring accuracy, calibration and resolution, have different 
functions and inform on different aspects of metacognitive monitoring. That is, in the same 
experimental paradigm, calibration might be high, while resolution might be low, or vice versa 
(Koriat, Sheffer, & Ma'ayan, 2002). Yet, monitoring accuracy may not only be impacted by 
distinct measurement methods, but also by distinct knowledge domains (Erickson & Heit, 2015; 
West & Stanovich, 1997). The relationship between indices of monitoring accuracy and domain 
knowledge was therefore considered in the present study.  
Domain-Generality versus Domain-Specificity 
 Overconfidence has been displayed across various domains, including predictions of sports 
outcomes (Ronis & Yates, 1987), reading comprehension (Glenberg & Epstein, 1987; Lin & 
Zabrucky, 1998), problem solving (Ackerman & Zalmanov, 2012; García et al., 2016), financial 
decision-making (Malmendier & Tate, 2008; Zacharakis & Shephard, 2001; Schrand & 
Zechman, 2012) and general knowledge (Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980; Yates, Lee, & 
Bush, 1997). Regarding resolution, some domains are characterized by low resolution (e.g., 
reading comprehension; Thiede, Griffin, Wiley, & Anderson, 2010), while others typically show 
high resolution (e.g., problem solving; Ackerman & Zalmanov, 2012). Despite the breadth of 
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studied domains, these domains have been largely explored in isolation and have rarely been 
examined in parallel in the same study (Erickson & Heit, 2015). As such, an important 
consideration is whether calibration and resolution are general and independent of the domain 
under study, or whether they are specific and closely related to content knowledge.  
 According to the domain-general hypothesis, being able to endorse confidence judgments 
that accurately match one’s performance reflects a skill, or trait, that one can apply across 
different areas of functioning (e.g., Erickson & Heit, 2015; Kleitman; 2008; Kleitman & 
Stankov, 2001; Pallier et al., 2002; Veenman & Verheij, 2003). In particular, when considering 
several tasks, a picture of the calibration bias being a characteristic of individuals has 
consistently emerged. For example, Schraw, Dunkle, Bendixen, and Roedel (1995) found that 
students’ accuracy scores were correlated across five different subject domains, concluding that 
calibration is governed by general metacognitive processes, independent of content knowledge. 
Similarly, Jackson and Kleitman (2014) found that confidence ratings on a medical decision task 
and cognitive ability indicators measured by solving Raven Matrices and a vocabulary 
questionnaire showed a robust bias across tasks. People who tend to be overconfident on one 
type of task therefore tend to be overconfident on other types of tasks.  
In contrast, the domain-specific hypothesis suggests that calibration reflects the ability to 
assess specific content knowledge and that these abilities can vary depending on individuals’ 
comfort with the content area in question. Studies in support of the domain-specific view have 
demonstrated that calibration and resolution are in fact inconsistent across subject areas and can 
be sensitive to task domain (e.g., Glaser, 1991).   
Findings from research that has explored the question of domain-generality versus 
domain-specificity (Erickson & Heit, 2015; Kelemen, Frost, & Weaver, 2000; Klayman, 
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González-Vallejo, & Barlas, 1999; Pallier et al., 2002; Perfect, 2004; Scott & Berman, 2013; 
Veenman, Van Hout-Wolters, & Afflerbach, 2006; Veenman & Verheij, 2003; West & 
Stanovich, 1997) have yielded inconclusive findings. In an effort to consolidate these two views, 
some researchers have suggested a developmental model in which abilities first emerge as 
domain-specific in early childhood and then eventually become general and applied across 
domains (Erickson & Heit, 2015; Veenman & Spans, 2005). In general, metacognitive abilities 
are thought to formally appear between the ages of eight and ten, with expected age-related 
improvements taking place during middle and late childhood, and more developed abilities being 
fully formed by adolescence and early adulthood (Lockl & Schneider, 2006; Veenman et al., 
2006). According to the mixed-model view, emerging adults (18-29 years of age) would be 
expected to display domain-general abilities, given that they are at the later end of this 
developmental trajectory. Domain-specificity however may also be apparent, depending on the 
domain in question and the reliance on content knowledge.  
One complicating factor for comparing across different domains is item difficulty 
(Koriat, 2012a). For example, one cannot fairly compare calibration in general knowledge and 
math calculation if the test items in each respective domain are not matched for difficulty. Item 
difficulty has been shown to be related to calibration, termed the hard-easy effect (Juslin, 
Winman, & Olsson, 2000; Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977), where easy test items tend to result 
in high accuracy and underconfidence but difficult test items result in low accuracy and 
overconfidence. Similarly, those with low knowledge are known to be more overconfident than 
those with high knowledge (see Miller & Geraci, 2011, for a review). These findings highlight 
the importance of using tasks with similar difficulty levels for when comparing monitoring 
accuracy across domains, in order to control for these differences (e.g., Erickson & Heit, 2015). 
 
 
 
8	
Thus, the experimental tasks developed for this study were piloted in order to try to match task 
difficulty across domains.  
Three Domains. To contribute to the understanding of domain similarities and 
differences, calibration and resolution were examined in the well-studied domain of general 
knowledge (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1977; Yates, Lee, & Bush, 1997) and compared 
to two understudied domains in this context: financial calculation and probability calculation. 
For each of these domains, the research has been focused either on calibration or on resolution, 
but no study to date has had both measures and none have compared these measures within 
individuals across these domains.  
General knowledge. General knowledge refers to accumulated and informal knowledge 
across several topics, as opposed to in-depth knowledge about one particular topic. General 
knowledge questions are the most well-known and widely-used means of measuring calibration 
(Lichtenstein et al., 1977; Yates et al., 1997). Overall, individuals tend to display overconfidence 
in their general knowledge (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Stanovich, West, & Toplak, 2016; West 
& Stanovich, 1997; Yates et al., 1997). Overconfidence in the domain of general knowledge 
therefore reflects a well-established bias in the confidence judgement literature.  
Numeracy. There has never been a time in human history that we have been faced with 
so much numerical information to process in our everyday lives. Making choices in finances and 
decisions involving probability information have become very prevalent in our modern society, 
and the complexity of these decisions have increased significantly with the availability of more 
financial aids than ever and more data available in domains such as probability outcomes of 
medical treatments. Given the omnipresence of numerical thinking and the importance of well-
developed calculation skills, literacy in the twenty-first century has been proposed as not only 
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including the ability to read and write, but also the ability to apply numerical thinking 
(Gigerenzer, Gaissmaier, Kurz-Milcke, Schwartz, and Woloshin, 2007). For these reasons, both 
domains of financial calculation and probability calculation were explored in this study.  
Financial calculation. Financial literacy reflects the ability to use numeric information 
and to make decisions regarding financial planning, wealth accumulation, debt, and pensions 
(Lusardi & Mitchell, 2014). Financial calculation represents the computational process through 
which financial knowledge is applied. In real-world financial problems, both literacy and 
calculation skills are simultaneously required. For example, calculating an interest rate requires 
interest rate knowledge in conjunction with basic computational abilities. In general, it has been 
reported that individuals tend to overestimate their ability to apply numeracy skills to financial 
contexts (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2014). This overestimation has been found to be widest for 
emerging and older adults, two time points in which financial numeracy may be most important 
(Chen & Volpe, 1998; Lusardi & Mitchell, 2014). That is, older adults are at the end of their 
financial life cycle, when decisions regarding debt, savings, and pension are most likely to take 
place. Similarly, young adults are in the beginning of their financial life cycle, when decisions 
regarding credit cards, loans, investments, and mortgages are more likely to be made. As such, 
the two time points in which individuals are making the most critical financial decisions coincide 
with the two time points in which individuals are most likely to display overconfidence, and 
therefore make biased financial-related decisions.  
 Research that has explored financial literacy in emerging adult samples has concluded 
that young adults lack the appropriate knowledge and skills of basic financial concepts, including 
the ability to understand and calculate inflation, risk diversification, and interest rates (Lusardi, 
Mitchell, & Curdo, 2019). Poor financial literacy can have negative consequences on financial 
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decision-making, such as increased challenges with debt (Lusardi & Tufano 2015), increased 
difficulty accumulating and managing wealth (Hilgert, Hogarth, & Beverly, 2003), and a 
decreased likeliness of retirement planning (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2007). For these reasons, we 
chose to study financial calculation in the current sample of undergraduate students. Emerging 
adults are in the developmental stage where they are leaving home, expanding financial 
responsibilities (e.g., rent, tuition, groceries, travel) and relying on credit and loans as they 
generally have not had sufficient opportunity to accumulate savings. Despite this increase in the 
need for financial competency, most emerging adults display low level finance skills and do not 
possess adequate financial knowledge (Chen and Volpe, 1998; Mandell, 2008). To assess this 
domain, financial calculation items that reflect ecologically and developmentally valid financial 
problems most relevant to emerging adults’ everyday financial decisions were developed, 
including conversion currency rates, costs and savings calculations, credit card interest rate 
calculations, and calculating bank interest rates. 
Probability calculation. A second numeracy domain considered in this study involved 
calculating probabilities in real-world contexts. From interpreting news headlines to 
understanding information about medical tests and procedures, probabilistic thinking has become 
a skill required in our everyday lives (Gigerenzer et al., 2007). Probability reasoning (e.g. “What 
are the chances that…”) plays a central role in decision-making, particularly in situations 
involving risk estimation. Research has demonstrated however that when information is 
presented via probabilities, individuals display significant difficulties in accurately interpreting 
risk level (Gigerenzer et al., 2007). In general, less numerate individuals have been found to have 
less wealth and to display poorer health (Peters & Bjalkebring, 2015). Individuals who display 
poor numeracy skills have also been found to be less accurate in comprehending medical 
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information and to make poorer health-related decisions (Gigerenzer et al., 2007). For example, 
Miron-Shatz, Hanoch, Doniger, Omer, and Ozanne, (2014) examined the impact of numeracy 
upon willingness to pay for BRCA1/2 testing in high-risk women reporting a family history of 
breast and ovarian cancer, by exploring how objective and subjective probability skills relate to 
willingness to pay for genetic testing. Study results found that subjective, but not objective, 
numeracy skills were correlated with willingness to pay (Miron-Shatz, Hanoch, Doniger, Omer, 
& Ozanne, 2014) As such, it was participants’ confidence in their ability to understand 
probabilistic information (i.e., subjective numeracy), and not their actual mathematical ability 
(i.e., objective numeracy), that had a direct impact on their health-related decision-making 
(Miron-Shatz et al., 2014).  
By exploring the question of domain generality versus specificity within these three 
domains of general knowledge, financial calculation, and probability calculation, the current 
study aimed to better understand whether accuracy is content- or person-dependent. However 
other factors such as cognitive abilities, aggregate judgments of task performance, difficulty, and 
effort, as well as personal dispositions may also impact individuals’ ability to effectively monitor 
their performance (Ackerman, 2019; Ackerman & Thompson, 2017; Thompson, 2009; West & 
Stanovich, 1997). Thus, a better understanding of how individual level differences impact 
metacognitive monitoring was also warranted.  
Correlates of Monitoring Accuracy 
A variety of cues are thought to underlie the formation of metacognitive judgments, such 
as task specific information and ones’ own subjective experience. Although the most commonly 
studied individual difference index has been cognitive abilities, relatively little is known about 
the role of other person-related factors on confidence judgments in reasoning and problem-
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solving contexts, including the role of metareasoning processes (see Ackerman & Thompson, 
2017, for a review) and individual and dispositional differences (Thompson, 2009; West & 
Stanovich, 1997). In a review by Ackerman (2019) three levels of cues for metacognitive 
judgments were identified: (1) self-perceptions (i.e., domain knowledge, personality traits such 
as anxiety, “I am good/bad at this type of task”); (2) task characteristics (i.e., difficulty, format); 
and (3) momentary experiences (i.e., perceived ease of processing, familiarity). The current 
study, therefore, not only explored variability of confidence judgments across domains, but also 
across differences in cognitive abilities, task-specific judgments, and self-perceptions.  
Cognitive abilities. Research exploring person-related differences in confidence 
judgments has largely focused on two indicators of cognitive abilities: intelligence and executive 
functions (Stanovich & West, 1998). Intelligence is usually measured through the assessment of 
both crystallized and fluid abilities, whereas executive functions have been reflected by 
measuring working memory skills (Komori, 2016). Performance on both general knowledge and 
calculation tasks have been found to be positively associated with intelligence (Stanovich & 
West, 1998; Peters & Bjalkebring, 2015) and with working memory (Komori, 2016).  
Performance on knowledge calibration paradigms, such as the overconfidence index, has 
also been associated with cognitive abilities, such as self-reported SAT scores (Stanovich, West, 
& Toplak, 2016) and verbal and nonverbal intellectual abilities (Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & 
Fischhoff, 2007; Stanovich & West, 1998; Stanovich et al., 2016). Better calibration is therefore 
associated with better cognitive abilities. The explanation for this association has been attributed 
to the simulating and hypothetical reasoning that is required for successful performance on 
several decision-making and rational thinking tasks (Stanovich, 2011). That is, the mechanisms 
of cognitive decoupling allow individuals to simulate alternative worlds and to consider 
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hypothetical scenarios that are not in the immediate environment, requiring engagement of 
analytic processes to construct these scenarios. If poor calibration results from individuals’ 
exposure to environmentally unrepresentative knowledge, then at least some cognitive 
decoupling would be required to achieve better calibration (West & Stanovich, 1997). Cognitive 
decoupling is often indexed by individual differences in general cognitive abilities, such as 
intellectual abilities and executive functions (Stanovich, 2009). Thus, individual differences in 
cognitive decoupling mechanisms should be associated with calibration, which was expected to 
be replicated using the present study’s three cognitive tasks (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; 
Stanovich & West, 1998).  
Similarly, resolution has also been associated with cognitive abilities, particularly with 
depth of processing on reading comprehension tasks (Thiede et al., 2003). Studies that have 
examined methods to encourage greater depth of processing in learners have shown that greater 
processing improves resolution (Anderson & Thiede, 2008; Fukaya, 2013; Thiede, Dunlosky, 
Griffin, & Wiley, 2005; Thiede, Wiley, & Griffin, 2011). Recently, calibration of reading 
comprehension and problem solving was also found to be improved by task characteristics which 
call for depth of processing, although this improvement was more effective in computerized 
environments than in paper-based environments (Lauterman & Ackerman, 2014; Sidi, 
Spigelman, Zalmanov, & Ackerman, 2017). Thus, resolution was also expected to be associated 
with cognitive abilities in the current study.   
Task-specific judgments. Task-specific judgments relate to the information and beliefs 
individuals entertain about factors impacting overall performance in a task (Ackerman, 2019). 
Such task characteristics can include task-related abilities, task difficulty, and amount of 
processing effort required by the task (Ackerman, 2019). In order to gain a better understanding 
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of associations between task-specific judgments and monitoring accuracy, a series of aggregated 
judgments were collected, including pre-and postdictive confidence judgments, as well as ratings 
of task difficulty, required effort, and feeling of effort. 
Predictive and postdictive confidence judgments. Predictive confidence judgments 
reflect individuals’ subjective confidence in their knowledge or abilities, prior to a task, whereas 
postdictive judgments reflect individuals’ subjective confidence in overall performance, after 
completing a task. Predictive judgments are hypothesized to guide allocation and regulation of 
mental resources for a given task (see Ackerman & Thompson, 2017). If an individual estimates 
poor confidence in their ability to complete a task, they will likely invest more effort into the 
task, in order to be successful. As such, predictive confidence judgments require individuals to 
estimate a priori performance based on stored memory structures relevant to a given domain. 
Predictive judgments are considered to be theory-based, guided by individuals own theories 
about their abilities in a certain domain, as well as about the characteristics of the domain 
(Ackerman, 2019; Koriat, 1997).   
In contrast, postdictive confidence judgments require individuals to use their perceived 
performance on each task as a reference point for their rating. Postdictive judgments are 
considered to be experience-based, guided from the real-time experience of having recently 
completed the task and from elicited cues, such as ease of processing (Ackerman, 2019; Koriat, 
1997).  Both predictive and postdictive confidence judgments of performance have been shown 
to be positively associated with success rates across different domains (Erickson & Heit, 2015) 
and were considered in this study.  
Task difficulty, effort, and feeling of effort. In addition to judgments of performance, 
participants were asked to rate task difficulty, effort required, and their affective reaction to 
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engaging in mental effort, as aggregated judgments following each experimental task (Finn, 
2010; Hsu, Eastwood, & Toplak, 2017; Hsu et al., 2018). 
Task difficulty has been shown to impact confidence ratings (Juslin et al., 2000; Klayman 
& Soll 1999). The “hard-easy effect” is a well-known occurrence in calibration research and 
refers to the covariance between confidence judgments and task difficulty (Juslin et al., 2000), 
where individuals tend to overestimate the probability of success when a task is perceived 
as hard, and to underestimate the probability of success when a task is perceived as easy. That is, 
harder items are more likely to promote overconfidence, whereas easier items are more likely to 
promote underconfidence (Juslin et al., 2000). A similar negative correlation between 
confidence, indices of monitoring accuracy, and task difficulty was expected in the current study.  
In contrast, effort, and specifically the subjective feeling of effort as it relates to 
monitoring accuracy, has received less empirical attention. Studies that have explored the role of 
mental effort in confidence judgments have revealed somewhat mixed findings. Some findings 
support that individuals tend to attribute lower confidence ratings to tasks perceived as effortful, 
as the increased investment of effort is acknowledged and taken into account when estimating 
performance (for review, see Ackerman 2019). Other research (Chen, 2002) suggests that the 
experience of increased effort exertion leads to higher confidence ratings, due to an 
overestimation of performance (e.g., “If I worked this hard, I must be right”). Regarding the 
feeling of effort, individuals high in mental effort tolerance have been found to rate tasks as less 
difficult (Dornic, Ekehammar, & Laaksonen, 1991). That is, individuals with a greater ability to 
tolerate the aversiveness of increased effort expenditure are more likely to judge a task as less 
difficult. Hsu and colleagues (2018) also experimentally distinguished between the 
phenomenological experience of mental effort expenditure and that of discomfort, supporting 
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that both difficulty and discomfort were correlated, yet distinct from one another. Considering 
the relationship between overconfidence and difficulty described in the hard-easy effect, it can be 
hypothesized that poorer monitoring accuracy would not only be related to increased task 
difficulty, but also to increased effort and discomfort.  
As such, the present study asked participants to provide a separate rating of task 
difficulty, as well as required and experienced effort, for each task. It was important that these 
three ratings were associated with their respective task so that participants had a specific 
reference point for their subjective ratings in each domain. For each task, correlations between 
monitoring accuracy indices (i.e., calibration and resolution) and these additional aggregated 
judgments were examined.  
Self-perceptions. Individual self-perceptions were the final set of monitoring accuracy 
correlates explored in this study. Self-perceptions represent individuals’ beliefs about their traits, 
abilities, and knowledge and reflect one’s confidence in the ability to succeed on a given task or 
domain (Ackerman, 2019). However, the role of self-perceptions on indices of monitoring 
accuracy, such as calibration and resolution, have been generally less explored in the 
metacognitive research. Self-concept (defined as one’s perception of the self) and anxiety 
(defined as one’s physio-emotional reaction when thinking about or performing a task; Stankov, 
Lee, Luo, & Hogan, 2012) have both been identified as non-cognitive predictors of student 
achievement (Lee, 2009). Given the positive relationship between academic achievement and 
metacognitive monitoring (Hacker et al., 2008), as well as the cognitive nature of the present 
study tasks, self-perceptions of both academic self-concept and cognitive test anxiety were 
explored as potential monitoring accuracy correlates.  
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Academic self-concept. Self-concept represents a collection of descriptive and evaluative 
beliefs and perceptions about the self (e.g., “I am bad at mathematics”; Bong & Skaalvik, 2003; 
Kröner & Biermann, 2007).  Kröner and Biermann (2007) suggested that when individuals are 
asked to form a confidence judgment on a task they are unsure of, they are likely to base 
confidence judgments on how they perceive themselves to perform on similar tasks. This is what 
Ackerman (2019) refers to as a heuristic cue of self-perception, from which confidence estimates 
are formed. Given that an individual’s self-concept can change depending on the dimension 
being considered (e.g., academic self-concept versus social self-concept), measures of self-
concept should be closely related to performance domain. Academic self-concept, defined as 
knowledge and perceptions about the self in academic, achievement, and testing situations, was 
considered in this study, using a short form of the Academic Self Concept Scale (ASCS; 
Reynolds, Ramirez, Magriña, & Allen, 1980). The ASCS captures the academic facet of general 
self-concept and includes items surveying self-beliefs about academic achievement (e.g., “All in 
all, I am proud of my grades in college.”) and abilities (e.g., “I often expect to do poorly on 
exams”).  
Cognitive test anxiety. Similar to self-concept, anxiety can also be context-dependant, 
such that anxiety measures should be closely related to performance domain. Studies examining 
the role of anxiety on performance have noted that it is the cognitive component of anxiety, such 
as negative thoughts, worries, and rumination, that is most detrimental and that accounts for the 
largest proportion of variability in performance decline (Cassady & Johnson, 2002). That is, 
anxiety can negatively impact performance through the disruption and overloading of cognitive 
processes, such as working memory, as well as through the increased reliance on avoidance 
mechanisms. Given the current study’s focus on knowledge and processing domains, cognitive 
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anxiety, defined as cognitive reactions and internal dialogues regarding evaluative and 
performance situations (Cassady & Johnson, 2002), was explored. 
Research on how anxiety may impact confidence judgments is relatively sparse. Studies 
that have explored this association have provided some support for the relationship between 
increased anxiety and decreased monitoring accuracy (Everson, Smodlaka, and Tobias, 1999; 
Legg & Locker, 2009). For example, a study by Legg and Locker (2009) found that 
metacognitive skill moderated the relationship between math anxiety and performance, such that 
performance decreased as a function of increased anxiety. Similarly, Everson, Smodlaka, and 
Tobias (2009) demonstrated that increased test-taking anxiety was related to decreased 
metacognitive motoring on a reading comprehension task, independent of actual reading ability. 
In contrast, some research demonstrates that certain levels of state anxiety can be helpful to high-
risk situations, given that feelings of uncertainty can lead to the allocation of greater effort and 
attentional resources (Macher, Papousek, Ruggeri, & Paechter, 2015). Considering these 
differing views, Morsanyil, Cheallaigh, and Rakefet (2019) have proposed that a new area of 
investigation connecting metacognition literature with anxiety research be explored. Such 
investigations can potentially help better our understanding of the metacognitive differences 
between anxious and non-anxious learners (e.g., task-related approach versus avoidance 
behaviours) and whether anxious learners are more or less prone to overconfidence, compared to 
non-anxious leaners (Morsanyil, Cheallaigh, & Rakefet, 2019). 
Based on this literature, the current study predicted that individuals with poorer academic 
self-concept and greater cognitive anxiety would display poorer calibration and resolution scores. 
Given that self-concept and anxiety have been found to be dissociable yet related (Lee, 2009), a 
positive correlation between both scales was also expected.  
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Real World Outcomes of Monitoring Accuracy 
Reviewed so far is how metacognitive accuracy may relate to domain, cognitive abilities, 
task-specific judgments, and self-perceptions. A final consideration would be to better 
understand how such skills relate to real-world consequences (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). 
Overconfidence has been associated with a number of real-world outcomes, such as several risk 
behaviors, externalizing behaviors, and substance use (Parker & Fischhoff, 2005) and several 
negative decision outcomes that vary in severity, from throwing out food to having a mortgage or 
loan foreclosed (Bruine de Bruin, Parker & Fischhoff, 2007). Efficient use of metacognitive 
monitoring skills, however, is not only relevant to decision-making research, but also to broader 
learning contexts. Particularly, in the current era of high-stakes testing, test performance has 
become increasingly important with direct effects on educational placement and admission, 
choice of major or specialization, and graduation (Hacker, Bol, & Keener, 2008). Research has 
demonstrated that the development and use of metacognitive skills are critical for student success 
across a variety of domains, including mathematics (Pugalee, 2001), reading (Presley, 2002), and 
writing (Pugalee, 2001). Monitoring accuracy has also been linked to academic achievement 
(Hacker et al., 2008). Following this line of research, a final, exploratory goal of the current 
study was to consider potential real-world metacognitive monitoring outcomes. Specifically, 
relationships between indices of monitoring accuracy, academic average, and self-reported 
learning challenges were investigated. Monitoring accuracy, cognitive abilities, and self-
perceptions were also explored as predictors of achievement and learning outcomes.   
Present Study 
Goals of the current study were to build upon and extend existing research on confidence 
judgments (for Study Overview, See Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Present study overview. This figure outlines the study goals, research questions, and hypotheses.
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First, both calibration and resolution, two related yet distinct measures of monitoring 
accuracy, were compared within and across domains.  Second, the question of domain-generality 
versus domain-specificity was explored through the development and use of novel tasks that 
measured real-life financial decision-making and probability calculations. Third, relationships 
between cognitive abilities, including intellectual abilities and working memory, and monitoring 
accuracy were assessed. Fourth, task-specific judgments, including predictive and postdictive 
confidence ratings, post-task ratings of task difficulty, effort required, and feeling of effort, as 
well as self-perceptions of cognitive anxiety and academic self-concept were explored as 
potential monitoring accuracy correlates. Last, the relationship between monitoring accuracy and 
real-world outcomes, including academic grades and self-reported learning problems, were 
explored.  Research hypotheses were as follows:  
Hypotheses relating to indices of monitoring accuracy. 
Hypothesis 1. As has been reported in the literature, an overconfidence bias was expected 
across all experimental tasks (Bjork et al., 2013; Soderstrom et al., 2015; Stanovich et al., 2016). 
Hypothesis 2. Given that a gamma value of “0” indicates a lack of relationship, and 
therefore lack of resolution, resolution was expected to be greater than zero across all tasks.  
Hypotheses relating to domain-generality versus domain-specificity. 
Hypothesis 3a. Resistance to overconfidence scores were expected to be correlated across 
experimental tasks. That is, better calibration on one task was expected to be positively 
correlated with better calibration on the other tasks (Jackson & Kleitman, 2014; Schraw et al., 
1995).   
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Hypothesis 3b. Even though domain-generality of calibration was hypothesized, in order 
to take into account the literature supporting domain-specificity (Glaser, 1991), it was 
hypothesized that resistance to overconfidence scores between similar domains (i.e., financial  
and probability calculations) would reflect stronger correlations compared to resistance to 
overconfidence scores between less similar domains (i.e., general knowledge versus 
calculations).  
Hypothesis 4. Although resolution has been found to be less consistent (Jackson et al., 
2016) and has been less explored across domains, it was hypothesized that resolution scores 
would also be correlated across experimental tasks, such that better resolution on one task would 
be positively correlated with better resolution on the other tasks. 
Hypotheses relating to success, confidence, and monitoring accuracy correlates. 
Hypothesis 5. Based on previous research (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Stanovich & 
West, 1998; Stanovich et al., 2016), working memory and intellectual abilities were expected to 
be positively associated with increased calibration and resolution scores, across general 
knowledge, financial calculation, and probability calculation tasks. 
Hypothesis 6a. Predictive confidence judgments were expected to be positively 
correlated with accuracy and confidence, as has been previously reported in the literature 
(Erickson & Heit, 2015).   
Hypothesis 6b. Similarly, postdictive confidence judgments were also expected to be 
positively correlated with accuracy and confidence (Erickson & Heit, 2015).   
Hypothesis 7. Poorer resistance to overconfidence scores were expected to be associated 
with higher confidence and increased ratings of task difficulty, required effort, and feeling of 
effort (Ackerman, 2019; Chen, 2002; Hsu et al., 2018).  
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Hypothesis 8. Poorer resolution scores were expected to be associated with higher 
confidence and increased ratings of task difficulty, required effort, and feeling of effort 
(Ackerman, 2019; Chen, 2002; Hsu et al., 2018). 
Hypothesis 9. In line with previous studies (Everson et al, 1999; Legg & Locker, 2009), 
poorer calibration scores were expected to be associated with poorer academic self-concept and 
increased cognitive anxiety.  
Hypothesis 10. Similar to calibration, poorer resolution scores were also expected to be 
associated with poorer academic self-concept and increased cognitive anxiety. 
Hypothesis 11. Self-perceptions of academic self-concept and cognitive anxiety were 
expected to be positively correlated with one another (Lee, 2009).  
Hypothesis 12. Correlates of monitoring accuracy including cognitive abilities, task-
specific judgments, and self-perceptions were expected to predict calibration scores.  
Hypothesis 13. Correlates of monitoring accuracy including cognitive abilities, task-
specific judgments, and self-perceptions were expected to predict resolution scores.  
Hypotheses relating to real-world outcomes of monitoring accuracy. 
Hypothesis 14. Poorer resistance to overconfidence scores were expected to be associated 
with lower grades and greater self-reported learning problems (Hacker et al., 2008). 
Hypothesis 15. Poorer resolution scores were predicted to be associated with lower 
grades and greater self-reported learning problems. 
Hypothesis 16a. Indices of monitoring accuracy, cognitive abilities, and self-perceptions 
were expected to predict real-world outcomes of academic achievement (Hacker et al., 2008). 
Hypothesis 16b. Indices of monitoring accuracy, cognitive abilities, and self-perceptions 
were expected to predict real-world outcomes of learning challenges (Hacker et al., 2008). 
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Method 
Participants  
The current study was a subset of a larger project investigating confidence judgments in 
emerging adults. Participants consisted of 153 undergraduate students attending York University, 
in Toronto, Canada. The data were collected during a single term. Participants were compensated 
two undergraduate research participant pool credits for their time. 
Of the 153 participants, 17 participants were excluded from data analyses (i.e., four 
participants reported English as a second language and identified language-related difficulties in 
understanding and/or completing study tasks; 11 participants did not complete full task battery 
due to time constraints; one participant did not complete tasks correctly; and one participant did 
not have adequate variability to calculate a resolution score). The remaining sample therefore 
consisted of 136 participants (102 females; 34 males) whose ages ranged from 18 to 30, with the 
mean age being 20.43 (SD = 2.77).  Most participants were in their first year of the 
undergraduate program (56.6%), reported their ethnicity as White/European (31.6%), identified 
English as first language (61.76%; participants who did not indicate English as a first language 
reported between six to 28 years of English speaking), and reported a current academic average 
between 70-79% (45.6%). Table 1 displays a summary of all participant demographic 
characteristics.  
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for Socio-Demographic Variables 
Socio-Demographic Variable Frequency Percent N 
Age (years) 
            18-21 
            22-25 
            26-30 
 
       99 
22 
8 
 
76.70 
17.0 
6.20 
129 
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Gender  
Male 
Female 
 
34 
102 
 
25.0 
75.0 
136 
Year in university 
1st year undergrad 
2nd year undergrad 
3rd year undergrad 
4th year undergrad 
5th year undergrad 
Post-BA Continuing 
Other 
 
77 
28 
18 
8 
2 
1 
2 
 
56.61 
20.58 
13.24 
5.88 
1.47 
0.74 
1.47 
136 
Ethnicity 
White/European 
Black 
Asian 
South-Asian 
Arab 
Latino-Hispanic 
Other   
 
 
43 
12 
23 
33 
5 
6 
14 
 
 
31.61 
8.82 
16.91 
24.26 
3.68 
4.41 
10.29 
136 
English as first language 
            Yes 
             No 
 
84 
50 
 
 
61.76 
36.76 
134 
Mother highest level of education 
            Less than 7th Grade 
            Junior high/Middle school 
            Partial high school 
            High school graduate 
            Partial college/university 
            College/university education 
            Graduate/Professional degree 
 
4 
5 
8 
22 
26 
48 
20 
 
 
3.00 
3.75 
6.01 
16.54 
19.54 
36.09 
15.03 
133 
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Measures 
Demographics. All participants were asked to report their age, gender, academic year, 
ethnicity, current academic average, parental level of education, family income, and perceived 
Father highest level of education 
            Less than 7th Grade 
            Junior high/Middle school 
            Partial high school 
            High school graduate 
            Partial college/university 
            College/university education 
            Graduate/Professional degree 
 
6 
2 
5 
23 
12 
49 
36 
 
4.51 
1.50 
3.75 
17.29 
9.02 
37.84 
27.06 
133 
Family income 
Well below average 
Below average 
Average 
Above average 
            Well above average 
 
 
2 
16 
75 
34 
5 
 
 
 
1.51 
12.12 
56.81 
25.76 
3.78 
 
132 
Current academic average 
50-59% 
60-69% 
70-79% 
80-100% 
 
        5 
36 
62 
27 
 
3.84 
27.69 
47.69 
20.76 
130 
Self-reported socio-emotional difficulties 
            No 
            Yes – minor difficulties 
            Yes – definite difficulties 
            Yes – severe difficulties  
 
       74 
43 
14 
1 
 
55.06 
32.57 
10.61 
 0.75 
132 
Self-reported learning difficulties 
            No 
            Yes – minor difficulties 
            Yes – definite difficulties 
           Yes – severe difficulties 
 
80 
45 
6 
1 
 
60.60 
34.09 
4.54 
0.75 
132 
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level of socio-emotional and academic difficulties (i.e., no difficulties, minor difficulties, definite 
difficulties, severe difficulties; see Table 1 for descriptive statistics). Appendix A contains the 
demographic form used in the current study.    
Experimental tasks. Three monitoring accuracy tasks in different domains, including 
general knowledge, financial calculation, and probability calculation were developed for the 
purpose of this study. All three tasks had the same multiple-choice format with four alternatives 
and the same confidence rating scale. The tasks were developed to be matched on total number 
of items, success rates, and confidence ratings. These measures were first piloted using a paper-
and-pencil version of the tasks with a sample of 18 undergraduate and graduate students to 
ensure that the instructions were clear and that items were not too easy or too difficult. Overall 
success rate was greatest for the Financial Calculation Task (82.18%), followed by the 
Probability Calculation Task (71.06%), and the General Knowledge Task (60.38%). Given that 
the pilot sample was comprised of several psychology graduate students, it was expected that 
success rate would be lower in the study sample, particularly on calculation tasks, given that 
graduate students had all completed PhD level statistical instruction and thus accumulated 
greater numeracy knowledge and skills. Items were therefore judged to be at a moderate level of 
difficulty, which permitted adequate variability in performance to calculate the different 
monitoring accuracy indices. Appendix B contains the pilot data for each task including item-by-
item success rate.   
Confidence rating scale. Confidence judgments were measured on an item-by-item basis 
with each item on the general knowledge, financial calculation, and probability calculation tasks 
being followed with a confidence rating scale. All tasks contained four multiple choice item 
responses, such that confidence judgments were marked on a scale ranging from 25% (i.e., 
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chance of responding correctly by guessing) to 100% (i.e., absolute confidence in answer 
provided). This confidence scale was based on previous confidence rating scales used in the 
decision-making literature (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). Details on how to use the confidence 
rating scale was presented to participants both orally and visually, with examiners providing 
instructions via projected PowerPoint slides. Practice trials were also presented prior to each 
task, to provide feedback and to ensure that participants understood how to complete the 
confidence rating scales.  
The general knowledge task was presented first with elaborated instructions for 
explaining the responses required and examples for completing the confidence ratings. The 
instructions were as follows: 
In this survey, you will be asked to answer general knowledge questions. There will be 
four options for each question (A, B, C, and D). Please choose the option that you think is 
correct for each question.  
  
Following each question, you will be asked to indicate how sure you are about your 
answer on a scale from 25% (Just Guessing, Not Confident at All) to 100% (Very 
Confident). Since there are 4 options for each question, 25% would mean you are just 
guessing and you are not very confident. Then, 100% would mean you are very confident 
and certain. Respond to each confidence rating immediately after answering the question. 
Spend no more than 5 seconds on each confidence rating. 
 
Here is an example: 
What is the name of a young sheep? 
A. Lamb 
B. Calf 
C. Baby 
D. Steer 
 
      |	.	.	.	.	|.	.	.	.	|.	.	.	.	|.	.	.	.	|.	.	.	.	|.	.	.	.	|.	.	.	.	|.	.	.	.	|.	.	.	.	|.	.	.	.	|.	.	.	.	|.	.	.	.	|.	.	.	.	|.	.	.	.	|.	.	.	.	|	
Please write the number that you just circled: ______________________ 
25%	 		35%	 85%	 100%	45%	 	65%	 75%	 	95%	Not	Confident		At	All		 Very	Confident			Pretty	Confident			Somewhat	Confident			
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Participants were instructed to first select one of the options (A, B, C, or D) and then to indicate 
how confident they were in their answer by circling the number on the scale and also writing 
down the actual number that they circled. Following these instructions participants were 
provided with examples of three potential responses on the confidence scale. In this example 
question, option A (i.e., Lamb) was the correct response. Using the response of “Lamb” (i.e., 
Choice A) for these examples, participants were instructed that a response of 25% would indicate 
they are guessing, a response of 100% would indicate that they are 100% sure, and a response of 
50% would indicate that they are somewhat confident.  These examples were displayed visually 
on the response form.  
General Knowledge Test. The General Knowledge Test assessed knowledge about a 
broad range of facts and subjects. Each multiple-choice item on the General Knowledge Test 
corresponded to four possible alternatives. The items were selected from published general 
knowledge norms reported in Tauber, Dunlosky, Rawson, Rhodes, and Sitzman (2013; which 
were updated from norms first published by Nelson & Narens, 1980). These norms provided 
recall accuracy and confidence ratings; items selected reflected a wide range of difficulty and 
confidence ratings, while avoiding floor and ceiling effects. Each question was presented 
separately, followed by the confidence rating scale. An example item is (* = correct response): 
What is the name of the largest ocean on earth? 
 
A. North Sea 
B. Atlantic 
C. Pacific* 
D. Indian 
Initially, the General Knowledge Test included 24 items. Yet, to calculate whether 
participants can discriminate between correct versus incorrect responses, adequate variability is 
needed, which is problematic with items that reflect either ceiling or chance performance 
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(Ackerman & Goldsmith, 2011; Leming & Flau, 2014). Thus, as is standard practice in 
conventional resolution research, floor items with an overall success rate of less than 10% or 
ceiling items with an overall success rate greater than 90% were removed. Although this is not 
common practice in calibration research, this was done for all calculations, in order to allow 
comparison between monitoring accuracy indices. As displayed in Table 2, eight items (three 
below 10% success rate and five above 90% success rate) were removed on the General 
Knowledge Test, leaving 16 items on this task for analysis1. Cronbach’s alpha for the General 
Knowledge Test was 0.21. Appendix C contains test questions, item-by-item success rate, and 
removed items. 
Table 2 
Success Rate Variability for General Knowledge Test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Items with overall success of less than 10% or greater than 90% were removed.  
																																																								
1 For the general knowledge task, due to a technical printing error, 38 participants missed completing two items on 
the task. Overall accuracy between participants who missed the two items and the remaining 98 participants was 
compared. There were no differences in overall accuracy. Thus, scores of these 38 participants were pro-rated for 
the statistical analyses.  
Success Rate (%)  Frequency Percent 
0-10 3 12.50 
10-20 2 8.33 
20-30 1 4.17 
30-40 2 8.33 
40-50 4 16.67 
50-60 4 16.67 
60-70 1 4.17 
70-80 1 4.17 
80-90 2 8.33 
90-100 5 20.83 
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Financial Calculation Test.  The Financial Calculation Test assessed individuals’ 
knowledge and calculation abilities related to financial decision-making. Each multiple-choice  
item on the Financial Calculation Test corresponded to four possible alternatives and was 
presented separately, followed by the confidence rating scale. Test items were chosen based on  
real-world scenarios and calculations relevant to emerging adults. Test items include conversion 
currency rates (6 items), costs and savings calculations (6 items), credit card interest rates on 
unpaid balances (6 items) and bank interest rates (6 items). An example item is (* = correct 
response): 
Janice has a job where she earns $2000 per month. She spends $900 for rent and $150 for 
groceries each month. She also spends $250 per month on transportation. If she budgets 
$100 each month for clothing, $200 for restaurants and $250 for everything else, how 
long will it take her to save $750?  
 
A. 3 months 
B. 4 months 
C. 5 months* 
D. 6 months 
Initially, the Financial Calculation Test included 24 items. Similar to the General Knowledge 
Test, items with success rate corresponding to 10% or less, as well as items with success rate 
corresponding to 90% or more were subsequently removed (for success rate variability, see 
Table 3). Six items were therefore removed from analyses such that the Financial Calculation 
Test corresponded to 18 items (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.77). Appendix C contains the test 
questions, item-by-item success rate, and removed items.  
Probability Calculation Test. The Probability Calculation Test assessed individuals’ 
ability to make judgments based on probabilities. Test items included calculating the likelihood 
of an event (such as a coin toss, dice toss or pulling random balls out of a bag; 9 items), 
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calculating decimals from fractions to identify the correct response (11 items), and comparing 
probabilities in decimal format (4 items). Each multiple-choice item on the Probability 
Calculation Test corresponded to four possible alternatives. Each question presented separately, 
followed by the confidence rating scale. An example item is (* = correct response): 
A chance of miscarriage is approximately 15% during the first 20 weeks of pregnancy. 
Drug use can triple the incidence of miscarriage during this time. If a pregnant woman 
uses drugs during her first 20 weeks, what chance does she have of having a miscarriage? 
 
A. 15% 
B. 30% 
C. 45%* 
D. 60% 
 
Table 3 
Success Rate Variability for Financial Calculation Test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Items with overall success of less than 10% or greater than 90% were removed.  
Similar to the General Knowledge and Financial Calculation tests, the Probability 
Calculation Test initially included 24 items. Items with success rate corresponding to 10% or 
less, as well as items with success rate corresponding to 90% or more were subsequently 
removed (for a success rate variability, see Table 4). Three items were therefore removed from 
Success Rate (%) Frequency Percent 
0-10 0 0 
10-20 0 0 
20-30 0 0 
30-40 1 4.17 
40-50 1 4.17 
50-60 5 20.83 
60-70 5 20.83 
70-80 3 12.5 
80-90 3 12.5 
90-100 6 25 
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analyses such that the Probability Calculation Test corresponded to 21 items (Cronbach’s alpha = 
0.69). Appendix C contains the test questions, item-by-item success rate, and removed items. 
Table 4 
Success Rate Variability for Probability Calculation Test 
                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Note. Items with overall success of less than 10% or greater than 90% were removed.  
Indices of monitoring accuracy. The degree of fit between confidence judgments and 
performance can be examined in various ways. The present study focused on two monitoring 
accuracy indices: (1) calibration (i.e., bias, overconfidence, and resistance to overconfidence) 
and (2) resolution. Figure 2 summarizes indices used in this study. 
Calibration. Calibration represents how well subjective confidence judgments match 
actual performance. There are different ways to index calibration, such that various measures of 
calibration have been used within the metacognition, education, and decision-making literature. 
The present study focused on three calibration indices: (1) the bias index, (2) the overconfidence 
index, and (3) the resistance to overconfidence index.  
 
 
Success Rate (%) Frequency Percent 
0-10 0 0 
10-20 0 0 
20-30 0 0 
30-40 2 8.33 
40-50 6 25 
50-60 2 8.33 
60-70 6 25 
70-80 4 16.67 
80-90 1 4.17 
90-100 3 12.5 
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Figure 2. Indices of monitoring accuracy. This figure summarizes monitoring accuracy indices 
used in the current study. 
Bias index (Ronis & Yates, 1987). Bias measures the degree of over or underconfidence, 
as well as the direction of judgment errors. It is the difference between the mean subjective 
probability of a correct answer (i.e., mean confidence rating) and the proportion of correct 
answers (i.e., percent of items answered correctly). The bias index is represented by the 
following formula:  
Bias index = mean confidence - percent correct 
The bias index ranges from -1 to +1 with -1 indicating underconfidence, zero indicating perfect 
calibration and +1 indicating overconfidence. Scores close to zero indicate a lack of bias, such 
that confidence is matched with performance (see Figure 3).   
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Calibration
Degree of fit between 
confidence judgments and 
performance
Bias Index
Ranges from -1 to 1; positive and above zero = 
overconfidence; negative and below zero = 
underconfidence; close to zero = no bias
Overconfidence Index
Ranges from 0 to 1; closer to 1 = poorer calibration; 
closer to 0 = greater calibration ; 0 = perfect calibration
Resistance to Overconfidence Index
Ranges from 0 to 1; closer to 1 = greater calibration; 
closer to 0 = poorer calibration ; 1 = perfect calibration
Resolution
Capacity to discriminate 
between correct versus 
incorrect items 
Goodman–Kruskal Gamma Correlation
Ranges from 0 to 1; closer to 1 = greater resolution; 
closer to 0 = poorer resolution
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Overconfidence index (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Parker & Fischhoff, 2007). For 
investigations including individual difference variables, where scores are unidirectional and 
range from zero to one, the bias index cannot be examined in correlational analyses with these 
very variables, as both ends of the bias index measure a type of miscalibration (see Figure 3). 
Bias 
 
Overconfidence 
 
Resistance to 
overconfidence 
 
Resolution 
 
Figure 3. Depiction of monitoring accuracy indices. This figure depicts the range and direction 
of each monitoring accuracy index.  
 
Thus, a measure to index the magnitude of the bias score to measure the raw degree of 
miscalibration was needed. As the tendency for participants is to display over- rather than 
underconfidence, and to be consistent with the decision-making literature (Stanovich, West & 
Toplak, 2016), we called this variable the overconfidence index. As such, the overconfidence 
index reflects the difference between confidence judgments and performance. It is the absolute 
difference between mean confidence and percentage correct. The overconfidence index is 
represented by the following equation: 
Overconfidence index = | mean confidence - percent correct | 
0 -1 + 1 
Underconfidence             Perfect calibration                  Overconfidence 
0  1 
Perfect calibration                                                         Poor calibration 
0  1 
Poor calibration                                                         Perfect calibration 
0  1 
Poor resolution                                                             Perfect resolution 
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Overconfidence values range from 0 to 1, with higher scores reflecting a greater difference 
between confidence and performance (i.e., poorer calibration) and lower scores reflecting a 
smaller difference between confidence and calibration (i.e., better calibration). A score of zero 
means that confidence is perfectly matched with performance (see Figure 3).   
Resistance to overconfidence index (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Parker & Fischhoff, 
2007). The overconfidence index assesses the magnitude of the miscalibration rather than the 
direction of the miscalibration. Consequently, overconfidence was subtracted from one to 
measure resistance to overconfidence, so that higher scores indicate better calibration; this is also 
consistent with analyses of the resolution index where a higher score indicates better resolution. 
The resistance to overconfidence index was therefore formulated for the current study and is the 
inverse of the overconfidence index described above. It is represented by the following equation:  
Resistance to overconfidence index = 1- | mean confidence - percent correct | 
As described above, overconfidence values range from 0-1, with higher scores reflecting poor 
calibration. The resistance to overconfidence scores also range from 0 – 1, but higher scores 
reflect better calibration. A score of 1 means that confidence is perfectly matched with 
performance (see Figure 3).  
Resolution (Koriat, 2012a). Resolution, also known as discrimination or relative 
accuracy, is another metacognitive index used to examine monitoring accuracy. Resolution 
reflects an individual’s capacity to discriminate between correct versus incorrect items and to 
assign an appropriate level of confidence to each. High resolution occurs if participants can 
accurately assign higher probability of being correct to correct answers (e.g., 100% confidence in 
a correct answer) and a lower probability of being correct to incorrect answers (e.g., 25% 
confidence in an incorrect answer). The resolution index was measured with the use of the 
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Goodman–Kruskal Gamma correlation (Nelson, 1984; Masson & Rotello, 2009; Schraw, 2009) 
and involved a within-subjects measure of the relationship between confidence judgments and 
the correctness on each individual item (Koriat et al., 2009). Resolution values range from 0 to 1, 
with higher values representing higher resolution and lower values representing lower resolution 
(see Figure 3). Mean resolution scores were also compared to 0 by one-sample t-test, to support 
that participants were not using the confidence scale arbitrarily and were meaningfully 
discriminating between correct and incorrect responses.  
Task-specific judgments.  
Predictive judgments. Prior to completing each task, participants were asked for an 
aggregated predictive judgment regarding their ability to answer general knowledge questions 
(i.e., How confident are you in your ability to correctly answer general knowledge questions, 
such as “What is the capital of Greece?”), their ability to solve financial calculation problems 
(i.e., How confident are you in your ability to correctly solve real-world calculation problems, 
such as “How many Canadian dollars in 30 US dollars?”) and their ability to solve probability 
calculation problems (i.e.,  How confident are you in your ability to correctly solve probability 
questions, such as “Two coins are tossed, what is the probability that two heads are obtained?”). 
Participants were asked to rate their confidence judgments on the following scale:
 
Postdictive judgments. Following each of experimental task, participants were asked to 
re-rate their performance on the same scale described above (e.g., “How confident are you in 
your ability to correctly solve general knowledge questions?”; 0 = Not Confident at All; 10 = 
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Very Confident).  
Task difficulty, effort, and effort required. After each experimental task, participants 
were also asked to rate aggregated judgments of experienced difficulty (i.e., “How difficult did 
you find this task?”; 0 = Not Difficult at All; 10 = Very Difficult), required effort (i.e., “How 
much effort was required of you to complete this task?”; 0 = No Effort at All; 10 = Extreme 
Effort) and the feeling associated with expending effort (i.e., “How did using that level of effort 
make you feel?”; 0 = Extremely Pleasant; 10 = Extremely Unpleasant).  Tables 5, 6, and 7 
contains means, standard deviations, ranges, and normality estimates for the aggregated ratings 
of each experimental task. The ratings were approximately normally distributed.   
Cognitive ability tasks. Cognitive ability encompassed two domains of cognitive 
functioning: (1) intellectual ability and (2) working memory.  
Intellectual ability. The Shipley-2 (Shipley, Gruber, Martin, & Klein, 2009) provided an 
estimate of general intelligence and included two subtests: Vocabulary and Block Patterns. The 
Shipley-2 can be administered individually or in groups, with an administration time of 20 
minutes. On the Vocabulary subtest, participants were asked to choose amongst four alternatives 
which definition most closely matches the target word. On the Block Patterns subtest, 
participants were asked to choose amongst four alternatives which block best completes the 
design. Scores on the Vocabulary subtest are thought to reflect crystalized abilities, whereas 
scores on the Block Patterns subtest represent fluid reasoning abilities. In addition to looking at 
subtests separately, raw scores (not age corrected) were also standardized and summed to create 
a composite score of general intelligence, called the Intelligence Raw Score Composite. The 
Shipley Vocabulary test has been reported to range from .85 to .92 across age groups and the 
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Block Patterns has been reported to range from .88 to .94 across age groups for internal 
consistency (Shipley et al., 2009). Higher scores indicated better intellectual abilities.  
Working memory. Based on the methods of Turner and Engle (1989), the reading span 
task provided a measure of working memory. This task was group administered with sentences 
presented on PowerPoint slides via a projector screen (see Appendix D). This task included 12 
blocks, each consisting of two, three, four, or five sentences. There was a total of 42 items (i.e., 
two sets of two, three, four and five sentences). Participants were provided with a response form 
to follow along with while direct instructions were given by the examiner. Participants were 
provided with the following instructions: 
You will see a sentence on the screen. Your job is to read the sentence out loud, along 
with me. As soon as you have finished reading the sentence, decide if the sentence is 
True or False by checking off either True or False on the sheet of paper in front of you.  
There will be 12 sets of sentences, each set containing 2-5 sentences. After each set, you 
will be prompted to write down the last word of each sentence from that set (e.g., “What 
was the last word in each sentence that you read in Set #1?) Don’t worry about spelling!  
Please put your pencils down as soon as you have finished writing the words. 
 
Participants were presented with a practice block with two sentences before the actual 
test blocks were started. For each trial, participants were asked to circle on the response form 
whether sentences are true or false (e.g., “Cucumbers are green”), while also having to commit 
the last word in each sentence to memory (e.g., “green”). At the end of each block, participants 
were asked to recall the to-be-remembered words from the entire block. Recall accuracy was the 
dependent measure on this task. Higher scores reflected better working memory abilities. Present 
Cronbach’s alpha = 0.66.  
Self-perception scales. Self-perceptions measured in the present study included 
academic self-concept and cognitive anxiety. 
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Academic Self-Concept Scale (Reynolds, Ramírez, Magriña, & Allen, 1980). The 
Academic Self-Concept Scale (ASCS) assessed the academic facet of general self-concept. A 
short-form 22-item version was used in this study. Participants were asked to rate their level of 
agreement with various statements on a six-point Likert-type scale (1= “disagree strongly”, 2 = 
“disagree moderately”, 3= “disagree slightly”, 4= “agree slightly”, 5= “agree moderately”, 6 = 
“agree strongly”). Higher total scores on the ASCS indicated greater academic self-concept. Two 
examples items are “I often get discouraged about school” and “If I try hard enough, I will be 
able to get good grades.” Present Cronbach’s alpha = 0.92. 
Cognitive Test Anxiety Scale (Cassady & Johnson, 2002). The Cognitive Test Anxiety 
Scale (CTAS) is a 27-item measure that assessed the cognitive dimension of performance-related 
anxiety. Participants were asked to rate their level of agreement with various statements on a six-
point Likert-type scale (1= “disagree strongly”, 2 = “disagree moderately”, 3= “disagree 
slightly”, 4= “agree slightly”, 5= “agree moderately”, 6 = “agree strongly”). Higher total scores 
on the CTAS usual indicate less cognitive test anxiety. To facilitate comparisons with other 
variables in the present study which were scaled in the positive direction, scores on the CTAS 
were reversed, such that higher scores indicated increased cognitive anxiety. Two examples 
items are “I tend to freeze up on things like intelligence tests and final exams” and “The prospect 
of taking a test in one of my courses would not cause me to worry.”  Present Cronbach’s alpha = 
0.93. 
Self-perceptions raw composite score. For regression analyses, reported later, a 
composite self-perception score that combined scores on measures of academic self-concept and 
cognitive test anxiety was used, as measures where highly correlated (r(136) = -0.72, p > 0.01) 
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and allowed to reduce the number of predictors in the overall regression models. To form this 
index, scores on the ASCS and on the CTAS were standardized and summed.  
 Real-world outcome variables.  Real-world outcome variables considered included 
academic average and learning challenges. Table 9 contains means, standard deviations, range 
and normality estimates for real-world outcome variables. All variables were approximately 
normally distributed.  
 Academic average. Participants were asked to select which of the following categories 
best represented their current academic average: (1) below 49%, (2) 50-59%, (3) 60-69%, (4) 70-
79%, or (5) 80-100%. Higher scores indicated higher self-reported academic average.   
Learning challenges. Participants were asked to rate their perceived level of learning 
difficulties by rating the question “Overall, do you think that you have difficulties in learning or 
academics?” on a four-point Likert-type scale (1 = “no”; 2 = “minor difficulties”; 3 = “definite 
difficulties”; 4 = “severe difficulties”).  Higher scores indicated greater perceived learning 
challenges.  
Procedure 
Testing sessions were conducted in group format and were 120 minutes in length. A 
maximum of 10 participants were tested at one time and each testing session included two 
examiners. Participants were first instructed to complete and sign informed consent and 
demographic forms. Once initial forms were collected, participants were then engaged in the 
group-administered reading span working memory task presented on PowerPoint slides via a 
projector screen, followed by instructions to complete both the Vocabulary and Block Patterns 
subtests of the Shipley-2. Participants were then each provided with a calculator and asked to 
independently complete the general knowledge, financial calculation, and probability calculation 
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tasks. Tasks from the current study were counterbalanced with tasks for another study, so that 
participants received the tasks in one of two possible order formats. There were no statistically 
significant differences in success rate between the tasks based on presentation order (ps > 0.05). 
Once all study tasks where completed, participants were asked to answer a questionnaire that 
included measures of academic self-concept and cognitive anxiety. 
Results 
Data Management 
All variables of interest were first examined for missing values and accurate data entry. 
For the general knowledge task, due to a technical printing error, 38 participants missed 
completing two items on the task. Overall success rate between participants who missed the two 
items and the remaining 98 participants was compared. There were no statistically significant 
differences in overall success rate (p > 0.05) between both sets of participants. Scores of these 38 
participants were therefore pro-rated for the statistical analyses. Other missing values were dealt 
with by mean substitution. Out-of-range values, plausible means, and standard deviations were 
also examined for all variables of interest. Variables of interest showed normal distributions with 
skewness values below 3 and kurtosis values below 10 (Kline, 2005).  
There were no significant sex differences in resistance to overconfidence for general 
knowledge, t(134) = 0.72, p = 0.47, financial calculation, t(135)= -0.36, p = 0.72, or probability 
calculation, t(135)= 0.52, p = 0.60. Similarly, there were no significant sex differences in 
resolution for general knowledge, t(134) = 0.72, p = 0.11, financial calculation, t(124)= -0.36, p 
= 0.23, or probability calculation, t(133)= 0.52, p = 0.26. As such, the present study did not find 
any sex differences in monitoring accuracy.    
Success, Confidence, and Indices of Monitoring Accuracy 
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The first goal of the present study was to measure the relationships between accuracy, 
confidence, and indices of monitoring accuracy, including calibration (i.e., bias and resistance to 
overconfidence) and resolution. Definitions for the various variables of interest are summed in 
Table 5. 
Table 5 
Definitions of Study Variables 
 
Variable Definition 
Metacognition  
         Accuracy/ Success Rate Accuracy represents a measure of task performance and refers to 
whether items are successfully completed.  
         Confidence Confidence represented the subjective feeling about the 
correctness of one’s answer. 
          Monitoring accuracy Metacognitive monitoring represents a subjective assessment of 
task performance. Monitoring accuracy refers to the fit between 
assessments of confidence and actual performance. Calibration 
and resolution represent measures of monitoring accuracy.  
Calibration  
         Calibration The degree of fit between confidence judgments and the 
objective accuracy of those judgments. Various indexes represent 
calibration, including bias and resistance to overconfidence. 
         Bias Refers to the direction of miscalibration: underconfidence occurs 
when confidence judgments are lower than actual performance; 
overconfidence occurs when judgments are greater than actual 
performance. 
         Resistance to  
         overconfidence 
Resistance to overconfidence represents the discrepancy between 
confidence and accuracy and assesses the magnitude of 
miscalibration. Higher scores indicate better calibration.  
Resolution  
         Resolution The degree to which participants can discriminate between 
correct and incorrect items, measured by the Goodman-Kruskal 
Gamma correlation (G). G represents the mean within-participant 
gamma correlation between confidence and accuracy. Higher 
scores indicate better resolution.  
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Success rate and confidence. Means and standard deviations for success rate and mean 
confidence are presented in Tables 6, 7, and 8 for the general knowledge, financial calculation, 
and probability calculation tasks respectively.  
The scores were approximately normally distributed for all variables. Three participants 
had extremely low mean confidence scores. These scores were retained as there was no 
justification for their removal. Analyses were conducted with and without the extreme scores, 
and the scores did not impact the pattern of results.  
As designed to be, mean success rates (global mean = 60.0%) and confidence ratings 
(global mean = 74.3%) on all tasks were in an intermediate level of difficulty, which allowed 
confidence variability above and below actual success rates. The small differences in success and 
confidence among the tasks allowed for comparison across the tasks (general knowledge: Msuccess 
= 0.53 (SD = 0.13), Mconfidence = 0.72 (SD=0.12); financial calculation: M success = 0.63 (SD = 
0.20), Mconfidence = 0.74 (SD=0.18); probability calculation: M success = 0.59 (SD = 0.17), Mconfidence 
= 0.75 (SD = 0.16)).  
Pearson’s correlations were run to assess the relationships between success and 
confidence (see Table 9). For all tasks, there was a moderate to large statistically significant 
relationship between mean success and mean confidence, r(136) = 0.41 to 0.71, ps < 0.01), 
suggesting that increased success was related to increased confidence across task domains. 
Figure 4 depicts mean success and mean confidence for all experimental tasks. 
Calibration. Means and standard deviations for monitoring accuracy indices of 
calibration (i.e., bias and resistance to overconfidence) are presented in Tables 6, 7, and 8 for the 
general knowledge (Mbias = 0.19, SD = 0.14; Moverconfidence = 0.80, SD = 0.12), financial  
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Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics for General Knowledge Test Dependent Variables (N = 136) 
Dependent Measure Mean (SD) Potential Range Observed Range Skewness Kurtosis 
Pre-Task Ratings      
Predictive confidence 
(10 = very confident) 
 
5.80 (2.09) 0 – 10 1 – 10 - 0.01 - 0.73 
Task Performance and Monitoring      
Success rate 0.53 (0.13) 0 – 1 0.21 – 0.94 0.03 0.20 
Confidence 0.72 (0.12) 0 – 1 0.28 – 0.96 - 0.76 0.91 
Bias 0.19 (0.14)  -1 – 1 -0.15 – 0.48 - 0.20 - 0.12 
Resistance to overconfidencea 0.80 (0.12)  0 – 1 0.52 – 1.00 - 0.38 - 0.48 
Resolution  0.35 (0.28) * 0 – 1 0 – 1 0.46 - 0.79 
Post-Task Ratings      
Postdictive confidence 
(10 = very confident)  
5.87 (1.88) 0 – 10 0 – 10 - 0.33 0.31 
Task difficulty 
(10 = very difficult) 
3.90 (2.10) 0 – 10 0 – 10 0.12 - 0.27 
Effort required 
(10 = extreme effort) 
4.62 (2.07) 0 – 10 0 – 9 - 0.23 - 0.38 
Feeling of effort 
(10 = extremely unpleasant) 
4.60 (1.74) 0 – 10 0 – 9 - 0.48 0.89 
Note. Asterisks indicate the significance of one sample t-tests for differences of calibration and resolution from zero.  
aHigher scores indicate larger discrepancy between confidence and accuracy. 
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Table 7 
Descriptive Statistics for Financial Calculation Test Dependent Variables (N = 136) 
Dependent Measure Mean (SD) Potential Range Observed Range Skewness Kurtosis 
Pre-Task Ratings      
Predictive confidence 
(10 = very confident) 
 
5.35 (2.24) 0 – 10 0 – 10 0.01 -0.44 
Task Performance and Monitoring      
Success rate 0.63 (0.20) 0 – 1 0.17 – 0.94 -0.18 -0.91 
Confidence 0.74 (0.18) 0 – 1 0.29 – 1.00 -0.27 -0.74 
Bias 0.11 (0.15)  -1 – 1 -0.21- 0.52 0.41 0.42 
Resistance to overconfidencea 0.86 (0.11)  0 – 1 0.29 – 0.52 0.24 0.14 
Resolution 0.43 (0.32) * 0 – 1 0.00 – 1.00 0.03 -0.12 
Post-Task Ratings      
Postdictive confidence 
(10 = very confident)  
5.54 (2.95) 0 – 10 0-10 -0.13 0.08 
Task difficulty 
(10 = very difficult) 
5.62 (2.46) 0 – 10 0-10 -0.38 -0.23 
Effort required 
(10 = extreme effort) 
6.47 (2.24) 0 – 10 0-10 -0.48 0.10 
Feeling of effort 
(10 = extremely unpleasant) 
5.93 (2.22) 0 – 10 0-10 -0.20 0.16 
Note. Asterisks indicate the significance of one sample t-tests for differences of calibration and resolution from zero. 
aHigher scores indicate larger discrepancy between confidence and accuracy. 
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Table 8 
Descriptive Statistics for Probability Calculation Test Dependent Variables (N = 136) 
Dependent Measure Mean (SD) Potential Range Observed Range Skewness Kurtosis 
Pre-Task Ratings      
Predictive confidence 
(10 = very confident) 
 
6.24 (2.06) 0 – 10 2 -10 0.20 -0.76 
Task Performance and Monitoring      
Success rate 0.59 (0.17) 0 – 1 0.14 – 0.95 -0.15 -0.78 
Confidence 0.75 (0.16) 0 – 1 0.25 – 1.00 -0.56 -0.23 
Bias 0.16 (0.15)  -1 – 1 -0.27 - 0.51 0.04 0.27 
Resistance to overconfidencea 0.82 (0.12) * 0 – 1 0.00 – 0.51 0.81 0.03 
Resolution 0.37 (0.28) * 0 – 1 0.00 – 1.00 0.25 -0.97 
Post-Task Ratings      
Postdicitve confidence 
(10 = very confident)  
5.31 (2.65) 0 – 10 0-10 -0.20 -0.85 
Task difficulty 
(10 = very difficult) 
5.47 (2.17) 0 – 10 0-10 -0.28 0.02 
Effort required 
(10 = extreme effort) 
6.14 (2.12) 0 – 10 0-10 -0.27 -0.04 
Feeling of effort 
(10 = extremely unpleasant) 
5.69 (1.96) 0 – 10 0-10 0.36 0.66 
Note. Asterisks indicate the significance of one sample t-tests for differences of calibration and resolution from zero. 
aHigher scores indicate larger discrepancy between confidence and accuracy
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Table 9 
Correlations Between Mean Success Rate, Mean Confidence, Resistance to Overconfidence and 
Resolution  
 
 1 2 3 4 
General Knowledge Task     
1. Mean success rate -- 0.41** 0.62** 0.11 
2. Mean confidence  -- -0.38** 0.24** 
3. Resistance to overconfidencea   -- -0.10 
4. Resolution    -- 
Financial Calculation Task     
1. Mean success rate -- 0.71** 0.52** -0.15 
2. Mean confidence  -- -0.07 -0.21** 
3. Resistance to overconfidencea   -- 0.00 
4. Resolution    -- 
Probability Calculation Task     
1. Mean success rate -- 0.60** 0.50** 0.24** 
2. Mean confidence  -- -0.25** 0.10 
3. Resistance to overconfidencea   -- 0.20* 
4. Resolution    -- 
a A higher score indicated better calibration.  
*p < .05. **p < .01.   
calculation (Mbias = 0.86, SD = 0.15; Moverconfidence = 0.14, SD = 0.11), and probability calculation 
tasks (Mbias = 0.16, SD = 0.15; Moverconfidence = 0.82, SD = 0.12).  
Bias index. The significance of one-sample t-tests for differences of bias from zero are 
marked by asterisks near the means in Tables 6, 7, and 8. The bias index was significantly 
greater than zero for the general knowledge task, t(135) = 16.22, p < 0.001, the financial 
calculation task, t(135) = 8.61, p < 0.001, and the probability calculation task, t(135) = 12.55, p < 
0.001. These findings indicated that across experimental tasks, confidence was not well matched 
with performance.  
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Figure 4. Mean success and mean confidence across experimental tasks. Mean percentage of 
participant (N = 136) success rate and confidence on the general knowledge, financial calculation 
and probability calculation tasks. 
 
Figure 5 depicts the number of participants who were overconfident (i.e., bias index 
scores above zero), underconfident (i.e., bias index scores below zero), and perfectly calibrated 
(i.e., bias index scores equal to zero). On the general knowledge task, out of 136 participants, 14 
participants were underconfident, one participant was calibrated, and 121 participants were 
overconfident. On the financial calculation task, 21 participants were underconfident, two 
participants were calibrated, and 113 participants were overconfident. On the probability 
calculation task, 13 participants were underconfident, two participants were calibrated, and 121 
participants were overconfident.  
As previously described, the bias index cannot be examined in correlational analyses for 
investigations including variables where scores are unidirectional and range from zero to one. 
The resistance to overconfidence index was therefore used as for all subsequent calibration 
analyses.  
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Figure 5. Confidence levels across experimental tasks. Number of participants (N = 136) who 
were underconfident, overconfident, and perfectly calibrated on the general knowledge, financial 
calculation and probability calculation tasks. 
 
Resistance to overconfidence. Pearson correlations were run to assess the relationships 
between the resistance to overconfidence index, mean success rate, and mean confidence (see 
Table 9). There was a large statistically significant relationship between resistance to 
overconfidence and mean success rate across all three tasks, r(136) = 0.50 to 0.62, ps < 0.01. 
Higher accuracy was therefore positively correlated with better calibration.  
The relationship between resistance to overconfidence and mean confidence seemed to 
vary across tasks. There was a moderate negative correlation between mean confidence and 
resistance to overconfidence within the general knowledge task, r(136) = -0.38, p < 0.01, 
suggesting that increased confidence in general knowledge was related to less awareness of 
accuracy. Similarly, there was a small negative correlation within the probability calculation 
task, r(136) = -0.25, p < 0.01, also suggesting that increased confidence in probability 
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calculations was related to poorer accuracy awareness. There was however no statically 
significant relationship between confidence and resistance to overconfidence on the financial 
calculation task (p > 0.05).  
The significance of one-sample t-tests for differences of calibration from zero are marked 
by asterisks near the means in Tables 6, 7, and 8. The resistance to overconfidence index was 
significantly greater than zero for the general knowledge task, t(135) = 79.93, p < 0.001, the 
financial calculation task, t(135) = 86.97, p < 0.001, and the probability calculation task, t(135) = 
77.23, p < 0.001. The resistance to overconfidence index in the study however reflects the 
magnitude of miscalibration, but does not take into account underconfidence in responses. In a 
separate analysis, accuracy was subtracted from confidence for each task. Obtained mean 
differences were then subjected to a one sample t-test. Even when underconfident responses were 
included, a significant overconfidence effect was still obtained across all tasks, t(135)=8.61 to 
16.22, p<.0001. These findings indicate that across experimental tasks, overall confidence was 
not well matched with performance, with a tendency towards over- rather than underconfidence.   
Resolution. Means and standard deviations for resolution, as measured by Gamma 
correlations2, are presented in Tables 6, 7, and 8 for the general knowledge (M= 0.35, SD = 
0.28), financial calculation (M= 0.43, SD = 0.32), and probability calculation tasks (M = 0.37, SD 
= 0.28) respectively. The gamma coefficient (G) represents the mean within-participant gamma 
correlation between the confidence and accuracy. The significance of one-sample t-tests for 
differences of resolution from zero are marked by asterisks near the means in Tables 6, 7, and 8. 
The resolution index was significantly greater than zero for the general knowledge task, t(135) = 																																																								
2 Another resolution index called the confidence-judgment accuracy quotient (CAQ; Jackson & Kleitman, 2014; 
Schraw, 2009) which provides a difference score between the average confidence assigned to correct and incorrect 
items, was also examined.  Across all of the analyses, parallel findings were found using the Gamma and CAQ 
indices.   
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14.87, p < 0.001, the financial calculation task, t(135) = 15.02, p < 0.001, and the probability 
calculation task, t(134) = 15.12, p < 0.001. Consistent with prior research, significant resolution 
effects were observed across tasks, indicating that participants discriminated successfully 
between correct and incorrect responses.  
Pearson’s correlations were run to assess the relationships between resolution, mean 
success, and mean confidence (see Table 9). These relationships seemed to vary across tasks. On 
the general knowledge task, there was a small positive correlation between mean confidence and 
resolution, r(136) = 0.24, p < 0.01, suggesting that greater confidence in a response was related 
to a better ability to discriminate between correct and incorrect answers. On the financial 
calculation task however, an inverse relationship was obtained, such that there was a small 
negative correlation between mean confidence and resolution, r(136) = -0.21, p < .01. This result 
suggests that on financial calculation items, greater confidence in a response is associated with 
poorer ability to discriminate between correct and incorrect. On the probability calculation task, 
there was no statistically significant correlation between mean confidence and resolution (p > 
0.05), yet there was a small positive correlation between mean success and resolution, r(136) = 
0.24, p < 0.01, and between resistance to overconfidence and resolution, r(136) = 0.20, p < 0.05. 
As such, on probability calculation items, greater resolution was associated with greater accuracy 
and calibration, but not with confidence.  
Calibration versus resolution. The relationship between calibration, measured by the 
resistance to overconfidence index, and resolution, measured by G, was explored within each 
experimental task. As indicated in Table 9, resistance to overconfidence and resolution scores 
were not significantly correlated for both the general knowledge task and the financial 
calculation task (ps > 0.05). These findings suggest that calibration was not associated with 
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successful discrimination between incorrect and correct responses for either the general 
knowledge or the financial calculation domain. However, there was a small positive association 
between resistance to overconfidence and resolution scores within the probability calculation 
task, r(136) = 0.20, p < 0.05. As such, within the domain of probability calculations, greater 
calibration was associated with greater discrimination between incorrect and correct responses.  
Domain Generality Versus Domain Specificity 
A second goal of the present study was to explore the question whether monitoring 
accuracy indices of resistance to overconfidence and resolution remain stable across domains or 
rather fluctuate as a function of domain knowledge.  
Pearson’s correlations were first run to assess the relationships between the resistance to 
overconfidence index and each experimental task (see Table 10).  
Table 10 
Correlations Between Resistance to Overconfidence and Experimental Tasks  
 1 2 3 
1. General knowledge resistance to overconfidence a -- 0.34** 0.22* 
2. Financial calculation resistance to overconfidence a  -- 0.49** 
3. Probability calculation resistance to overconfidence a   -- 
a A higher score indicated better calibration.  
*p < .05. **p < .01.   
There was a small statistically significant relationship between resistance to 
overconfidence on the general knowledge task and resistance to overconfidence on the 
probability calculation task, r(136) =0.22, p < 0.05. There was a moderate statistically significant 
relationship between resistance to overconfidence on the general knowledge task and resistance 
to overconfidence on the financial calculation task, r(136) =0.34, p < 0.01. There was a large 
statistically significant relationship between resistance to overconfidence on the financial 
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calculation task and resistance to overconfidence on the probability calculation task, r(136) 
=0.49 p < 0.01. These correlations indicated that better calibration on one task was associated 
with better calibration on the other tasks. However, as expected, stronger associations were 
observed between tasks that shared domain similarities, such as the calculation requirements on 
the financial calculation and probability calculation tasks (i.e., moderate versus small effect size). 
Using a Fisher r-to-z transformation which allows to statistically compare the differences 
between Pearson correlations, it was found that correlations between general knowledge and 
financial calculation and between general knowledge and probability calculations were 
statistically significantly different than the correlation between financial calculation and 
probability calculation (p < 0.05), further supporting this difference in correlation strength 
between domains.  
Pearson’s correlations were also run to assess the relationship between resolution and 
experimental tasks (see Table 11). There were no statistically significant relationships between 
resolution and experimental tasks (ps > 0.05).  The ability to discriminate between correct and 
incorrect responses on one task was therefore not related to the ability to discriminate between 
correct and incorrect responses on another other task.  
Table 11 
Correlations Between Resolution and Experimental Tasks  
 
 1 2 3 
1. General knowledge resolution -- -0.17 0.16 
2. Financial calculation resolution  -- 0.08 
3. Probability calculation resolution   -- 
*p < .05. **p < .01.   
Success, Confidence, and Monitoring Accuracy Correlates 
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A third goal of the present study was to further explore potential correlates of accuracy, 
confidence, and monitoring accuracy, including: (1) cognitive abilities (i.e., working memory 
and intellectual abilities), (2) task-specific judgments (i.e., pre- and postdictive confidence, 
aggregated ratings of task difficulty, effort required, and feeling of effort) and (3) self-
perceptions (i.e., academic self-concept and cognitive test anxiety). Relationships between 
monitoring accuracy and real-world outcomes measures of academic grades and learning 
challenges were also explored.   
Cognitive abilities. Descriptive statistics including means and standard deviations for 
working memory scores, Shipley Vocabulary scores (i.e., verbal abilities), Shipley Block Pattern 
scores (i.e., nonverbal abilities), and the Intelligence Raw Score Composite (i.e., summed and 
standardized Shipley Vocabulary and Block Pattern scores) are displayed in Table 12.  
Table 12 
Descriptive Statistics for Cognitive Ability Measures 
Note. N = 136 
Cognitive abilities and success rates. Pearson’s correlations were run to assess the 
relationships between cognitive abilities, success, and confidence (see Table 13). Across all 
 Mean (SD) Potential 
Range 
Observed 
Range 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Working Memory 
Total Raw Score 
32.10 (4.09) 0 – 42 20 – 42 -0.20 0.07 
Shipley- 2 Vocabulary 
Raw Score 
25.92 (4.35) 0 – 40  16 – 37 -0.1 -0.10 
Shipley-2 Block 
Patterns Raw Score 
16.18 (4.92) 0 – 26  5 – 26  0.01 -0.79 
Intelligence Raw 
Score Composite  
42.10 (6.94) 0 – 66 21 – 59  -0.01 -0.32 
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Table 13 
Correlations Between Cognitive Abilities, Mean Success Rate, Mean Confidence, Resistance to Overconfidence, and Resolution  
 
 Working Memory 
Raw Score  
 Shipley 2- Vocabulary 
Raw Score  
Shipley 2- Block 
Patterns Raw Score 
Intelligence Raw 
Score Composite  
General Knowledge Task     
Mean success rate 0.38** 0.41** 0.29** 0.46** 
Mean confidence 0.11 0.37** 0.16 0.35** 
Resistance to overconfidence a 0.22** 0.10 0.12 0.14 
Resolution 0.13 0.17 0.22** 0.26** 
Financial Calculation Task     
Mean success rate 0.17* 0.20* 0.49** 0.47** 
Mean confidence 0.05 0.12 0.42** 0.37** 
Resistance to overconfidence a 0.10 0.14 0.17 0.21* 
Resolution -0.20* -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
Probability Calculation Task     
Mean success rate 0.12 0.27** 0.51** 0.53** 
Mean confidence 0.01 0.05 0.37** 0.29** 
Resistance to overconfidence a 0.09 0.22* 0.23** 0.30** 
Resolution -0.02 0.14 0.18* 0.22* 
a A higher score indicated better calibration.  
*p < .05. **p < .01.
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tasks, there was a small to large positive statistically significant relationship between cognitive 
abilities and accuracy r(136) = 0.17 to 0.53, ps < 0.05). These findings suggest that greater 
working memory, nonverbal, and verbal abilities are all related to greater performance. The one 
exception was the lack of association between working memory and mean success rate on the 
probability calculation task (p > 0.05).  
Cognitive abilities and confidence. Associations between cognitive abilities and 
confidence varied across tasks. For the general knowledge task, there was a moderate positive 
statistically significant relationship between verbal abilities and mean confidence r(136) = 0.37, 
p < 0.01, and between mean confidence and intelligence composite scores, r(136) = 0.35, p < 
0.01. Greater verbal abilities and intelligence composite scores were therefore related to greater 
confidence in general knowledge items. There were no statistically significant relationships 
between mean accuracy and working memory or nonverbal abilities (ps > 0.05). For both the 
financial calculation and probability calculation tasks, there was a moderate positive statistically  
significant relationship between mean confidence and nonverbal abilities, r(136) = 0.37 to 0.42, 
ps < 0.01, and between mean confidence and intelligence composite scores, r(136) = 0.29 to 
0.37, ps < 0.01. As such, greater nonverbal abilities and intelligence composite scores were 
related to greater confidence in both financial and probability calculation items. There were no 
statistically significant relationships between mean confidence, working memory, and verbal 
abilities (ps > 0.05) on the financial calculation and probability calculation tasks.  
Cognitive abilities and indexes of monitoring accuracy. Pearson’s correlations were run 
to assess the relationships between cognitive abilities, resistance to overconfidence, and 
resolution (see Table 13). Associations between cognitive abilities and monitoring accuracy 
indexes varied across tasks. For the general knowledge task, there was a small positive 
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statistically significant relationship between resistance to overconfidence and working memory, 
r(136) = 0.22, p < 0.01, suggesting that greater working memory abilities were associated with 
greater calibration on general knowledge items. Moderate positive statistically significant 
relationships were also found between resolution and nonverbal abilities, r(136) = 0.22, p < 0.01, 
and between resolution and intelligence composite scores, r(136) = 0.26, p < 0.01. These 
findings suggest that greater nonverbal abilities and intelligence composite scores were related to 
greater confidence in general knowledge items. All other associations were non-significant (ps > 
0.05).  
For the financial calculation task, there was a small positive statistically significant 
relationship between resistance to overconfidence and intelligence composite scores, r(136) = 
0.21, p < 0.05, such that greater intelligence composite scores were associated with greater 
calibration on financial calculation items. A small negative statistically significant relationship 
was also found between resolution and working memory, r(136) = -0.20, p < 0.05. This finding 
suggests that greater working memory abilities are related to greater difficulty in discriminating 
between correct and incorrect items. All other associations between cognitive abilities and 
monitoring accuracy indices on the financial calculation task were non-significant (ps > 0.05). 
For the probability calculation task, there were small positive statistically significant 
relationships between resistance to overconfidence and verbal abilities, r(136) = 0.22, p < 0.01, 
between resistance to overconfidence and nonverbal abilities, r(136) = 0.23, p < 0.01, and 
between resistance to overconfidence and intelligence composite scores, r(136) = 0.30, p < 0.01. 
Greater verbal, nonverbal, and intelligence composite scores were therefore associated with 
greater calibration on probability calculation items. There was no statistically significant 
relationship between resistance to overconfidence on the probability calculation task and 
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working memory (p > 0.05). Regarding resolution, small positive statistically significant 
relationships were found between resolution and nonverbal abilities, r(136) = 0.18, p < 0.05, and 
between resolution and intelligence composite scores, r(136) = 0.22, p < 0.05. Greater nonverbal 
abilities and composites scores were therefore related to greater discrimination between correct 
and incorrect probability calculation items. There were no statistically significant relationships 
between resolution, working memory, and verbal abilities, on the probability calculation task (ps 
> 0.05). 
Task-specific judgments. A second series of potential correlates explored in the present 
study included task-specific judgments represented by aggregated pre- and postdictive 
confidence judgments and post-task ratings of task difficulty, effort required, and feeling about 
effort. Intercorrelations between task specific judgments across experimental tasks are displayed 
in Table 14.  
Across all tasks, there was a medium to large positive statistically significant relationship 
between predictive and postdictive confidence ratings, r(136) = 0.39 to 0.58, ps < 0.01, 
suggesting that participants performance estimation prior to completing a task was associated  
with their estimation after having experienced the task.  In each task, task difficulty was 
negatively associated with postdictive confidence ratings, r(136) = -0.37 to 0.54, ps < 0.01, and 
positively associated with both effort required and feeling of effort, r(136) = -0.37 to 0.69, ps < 
0.01. Thus, as perceived task difficulty increased, post task confidence in performance 
decreased. Furthermore, the more difficult the task was perceived, the more effortful and 
aversive the task was experienced. As expected, effort required and feeling of effort were also 
positively related across experimental tasks, r(136) = 0.27 to 0.59, ps < 0.01. 
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 Relationships between each task-specific judgment, success, confidence, and monitoring 
accuracy were then explored.  
Table 14 
Intercorrelations Between Task-Specific Judgments across Experimental Tasks 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
General Knowledge Task      
1. Predictive confidence -- 0.58** -0.26* -0.07 -0.09 
2. Postdictive confidence  -- -0.47** -0.16 -0.27** 
3. Task difficulty   -- 0.47** 0.27** 
4. Effort required    -- 0.27** 
5. Feeling of effort     -- 
Financial Calculation Task      
1. Predictive confidence -- 0.51** -0.20* -0.16 -0.22* 
2. Postdictive confidence  -- -0.54** -0.44** -0.44 
3. Task difficulty   -- 0.69** 0.55** 
4. Effort required    -- 0.59** 
5. Feeling of effort     -- 
Probability Calculation Task      
1. Predictive confidence -- 0.39** -0.11 -0.13 -0.06 
2. Postdictive confidence  -- -0.37** -0.25** -0.29** 
3. Task difficulty   -- 0.69** 0.39** 
4. Effort required    -- 0.42** 
5. Feeling of effort     -- 
*p < .05. **p < .01.   
Predictive and postdictive confidence judgments. Means and standard deviations for pre- 
and postdictive confidence judgments are presented in Tables 6, 7, and 8 for the general 
knowledge (Mpre = 5.80, SD = 2.09; Mpost = 5.87, SD = 1.88), financial calculation (Mpre = 5.35, 
SD = 2.24; Mpost = 5.54, SD = 2.95), and probability calculation (Mpre = 6.24, SD = 2.06; Mpost = 
5.31, SD = 2.65) tasks. As previously described, pre- and postdictive confidence judgments 
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represented aggregated judgments regarding the ability to answer task-related questions (i.e., 
“How confident are you in your ability to correctly solve general knowledge questions?”), rather 
than item-by-item confidence.  
Pre- and postdictive judgments for each experimental task were then compared. 
Participants predicted their probability calculation skills to be higher prior to completing the task, 
compared to after experiencing the task, t(135) = 4.12, p < 0 .0001. No differences were 
obtained on the general knowledge and financial calculation ratings, t < 1; and t < 1, 
respectively.  
Pearson’s correlations were run to assess the relationships between pre- and postdictive 
confidence ratings and mean success rate, mean confidence, resistance to overconfidence, and 
resolution (see Table 15).  Across all tasks, there was a small to large positive statistically 
significant relationship between pre- and postdictive ratings, mean success, and mean confidence 
r(136) = 0.25 to 0.69, ps < 0.05. These findings suggest that greater pre- and postdictive 
confidence judgments are related to greater item-by-item accuracy and confidence. The only 
exception was the lack of association between pre-task confidence and mean success on the 
general knowledge task (p > 0.05).  
The relationship between pre- and postdictive confidence ratings and monitoring 
accuracy indexes of resistance to overconfidence and resolution however were varied across 
tasks. On the general knowledge task, there was a small negative statistically significant 
relationship between predictive confidence and resistance to overconfidence, r(136) = - 0.24, p < 
0.01, suggesting that greater predictive confidence was related to poorer calibration. There was 
no statistically significant relationship between predictive confidence and resolution (p > 0.05).  
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Table 15 
Correlations Between Pre- and Postdictive Confidence, Task-Specific Judgments, Mean Success, Mean Confidence,  
Resistance to Overconfidence, and Resolution 
 
 Predictive 
Confidence 
Postdictive 
Confidence 
Task 
Difficulty 
Effort 
Required 
Feeling 
of Effort 
General Knowledge Task      
Mean success rate 0.07 0.25** -0.15 -0.12 -0.04 
Mean confidence 0.31** 0.57** -0.48** -0.25** -0.17* 
Resistance to overconfidencea -0.24** 0.21* 0.21* .010 0.13 
Resolution 0.10 0.19* -0.21* -0.16 -0.07 
Financial Calculation Task      
Mean success rate -0.28** 0.59** -0.47** -0.45** -0.36** 
Mean confidence 0.31** 0.69** -0.46** -0.45** -0.43** 
Resistance to overconfidencea 0.08 0.10 -0.12 -0.14 -0.01 
Resolution -0.04 -0.16 0.12 0.19* 0.04 
Probability Calculation Task      
Mean success rate 0.22* 0.42** -0.10 -0.25** -0.06 
Mean confidence 0.30 ** 0.60** -0.27** -0.26** -0.25** 
Resistance to overconfidencea -0.01 -0.10 0.10 -0.06 0.20* 
Resolution 0.08 0.08 -0.08 -0.16 -0.06 
aA higher score indicated better calibration.  
*p < .05. **p < .01.  
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Regarding postdictive confidence, there was a small positive statistically significant relationship 
between general knowledge and postdictive confidence and resistance to overconfidence, r(136)  
= 0.21, p < 0.05, as well as between both postdictive confidence and resolution, r(136) = 0.19, p 
< 0.05. Greater post-task confidence in general knowledge was therefore relater to greater on-
task calibration and resolution. Similar relationships were not observed between predictive and 
postdictive confidence judgments and monitoring accuracy indexes, on neither the financial 
calculation nor the probability calculation tasks.  
Task difficulty, effort, and feeling of effort. Means and standard deviations for task 
difficulty (Mknowledge = 3.90, SD = 2.10; Mfinancial = 5.62, SD = 2.95; Mprobability = 5.47 (SD = 2.17)), 
required effort (Mknoweldge = 4.62, SD = 2.07; Mfinancial = 6.47, SD = 2.24; Mprobability = 6.14, SD = 
2.12) and feeling of effort (Mknowledge= 4.60 , SD = 1.74; Mfinancial = 5.93, SD = 2.22; Mprobability = 
5.69, SD = 1.96) are presented in Tables 5, 6, and 7.  The means of the aggregated confidence 
ratings ranged in the 4-6 range on a possible range of 0-10, indicating that none of the tasks were 
rated as extremely difficult, requiring extreme effort, or as extremely unpleasant.  
Pearson’s correlations were run to assess the relationships between aggregated judgments 
of perceived difficulty, required effort, and feelings of effort with mean accuracy, mean 
confidence, resistance to overconfidence, and resolution (see Table 15). The relationships 
between post-task ratings and mean accuracy varied across tasks.  
For the general knowledge task, there was no statistically significant relationship between 
post-task ratings and mean success (ps > 0.05). There was a small to moderate negative 
statistically significant relationship between general knowledge post-task ratings and mean 
confidence, r(136) = -0.17 – -0.48, ps < 0.05, suggesting that greater perceived difficulty, 
required effort, and feelings of unpleasantness were related to lower confidence in general 
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knowledge items. Regarding monitoring accuracy indices, there was a small positive statistically 
significant relationship between perceived general knowledge task difficulty and resistance to 
overconfidence, such that greater perceived difficulty was related to greater calibration, r(136) = 
0.21, p < 0.05. There was also a small negative statistically significant relationship between 
perceived general knowledge task difficulty and resolution. Greater perceived difficulty was 
therefore related to a poorer ability to discriminate between correct versus incorrect items, r(136) 
= -0.21, p < 0.05.  
On the financial calculation task, there was a moderate negative statistically significant 
relationship between post-task ratings and both mean success and mean confidence r(136) = -
0.36 – -0.47, ps < 0.01). These findings suggest that greater perceived difficulty, required effort, 
and feelings of unpleasantness were related to lower success and confidence in financial 
calculation items. Regarding monitoring accuracy indices, there was a small positive statistically 
significant relationship between perceived effort required on financial calculation items and 
resolution, r(136) = 0.19, p < 0.01, suggesting that greater required effort was related to greater 
discrimination between correct and incorrect items. There were no other statistically significant 
associations between post-task ratings and indices of monitoring accuracy, for the financial 
calculation task.  
For the probability calculation task, there was a moderate negative statistically significant 
relationship between effort required and mean success rate, r(136) = -0.25, p < 0.01, such that 
greater perceived effort was associated with poorer performance. There were no statistically 
significant relationships between accuracy, task difficulty, and feeling of effort (ps > 0.05). 
There was a small negative statistically significant relationship between probability calculations 
post-task ratings and mean confidence r(136) = -0.25 – -0.27, ps < 0.01). Greater perceived 
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difficulty, required effort, and feelings of effort were therefore related to lower confidence in 
probability calculation items. Regarding monitoring accuracy indices, there was a small positive 
statistically significant relationship between feeling of effort and resistance to overconfidence, 
suggesting that greater unpleasantness was related to greater calibration, r(136) = 0.20, p < 0.05. 
There were no statistically significant relationships between resistance to overconfidence, task 
difficulty, and required effort (ps > 0.05). There were no statistically significant relationships 
between resolution, task difficulty, required effort, and feeling of effort (ps > 0.05). 
Self-perceptions and real-world outcomes. A final series of potential correlates 
explored in the present study were self-perception measures of academic self-concept and 
cognitive test anxiety. Real-world outcomes of academic average and learning challenges were 
also considered as further, exploratory analyses. Descriptive statistics including means and 
standard deviations are displayed in Table 16. Pearson correlations among the measures are 
presented in Table 17. 
Table 16 
Descriptive Statistics for Self-Perceptions and Real-World Outcomes 
Note. N = 136 
As expected, academic self-concept and anxiety were negatively related, such that poorer 
academic self-concept was related to greater cognitive test anxiety, r(136) = 0.72, p > 0.01. 
Cognitive test anxiety was also negatively related to learning challenges, such that increased self-
 Mean (SD) Potential 
Range 
Observed 
Range 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Academic self-concept 87.78 (16.97) 22 – 132 43 – 127  -0.11 -0.18 
Cognitive test anxiety 86.13 (22.00) 27 – 162 35 – 155  0.51 0.55 
Academic average 3.85 (0.79) 1 – 5 2 – 5  -0.22 -0.45 
Learning challenges 1.46 (.62)  1 – 4 1 – 4  1.24 1.39  
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reported learning difficulties were related to less cognitive test anxiety (p > 0.05). Learning 
difficulties were also negatively related to academic average, indicating that poorer grades were 
associated with increased learning challenges (p > 0.05). 
Table 17 
Correlations Between Self-Perceptions and Real-World Outcome Variables  
 
 1 2 3 4 
1. Academic self-concept -- -0.72** 0.02 0.01 
2. Cognitive test anxiety  -- -0.05 -0.20* 
3. Academic average   -- -0.23* 
4. Learning challenges     -- 
*p < .05. **p < .01.    
 Pearson’s correlations assessed the relationships between self-perceptions, success rates 
and confidence, monitoring accuracy indices, and real-world outcomes (see Table 18). For the 
general knowledge task, there was a small negative correlation between academic self-concept 
and mean success rate, r(136) = -0.21, p < 0.05, such that greater accuracy on general knowledge 
items was related to poorer academic self-concept. Regarding confidence, there was a small 
positive correlation between self-reported academic average and confidence, r(136) = 0.29, p < 
0.01, and a moderate negative correlation between self-reported learning challenges and 
confidence, r(136) = - 0.31, p < 0.01. These findings support that greater confidence in general 
knowledge items was associated with greater academic averages and with less self-reported 
learning challenges.  
For the financial calculation task, there was a small positive correlation between mean 
accuracy and cognitive test anxiety, r(136) = 0.20, p< 0.05, suggesting that increased test anxiety 
was related to greater accuracy. There was a small negative correlation between mean accuracy  
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Table 18 
Correlations Between Self-Perceptions, Real-World Outcomes, Mean Success Rate, Mean Confidence, Resistance to Overconfidence, 
and Resolution  
 
 Academic Self-Concept Cognitive Test Anxiety  Academic Average Learning Challenges 
General Knowledge Task     
Mean success rate -0.21* 0.08 0.17 -0.16 
Mean confidence -0.18 0.13 0.29** -0.32** 
Resistance to overconfidencea -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0.08 
Resolution -0.09 -0.09 0.09 -0.17 
Financial Calculation Task     
Mean success rate 0.02 0.20* 0.06 -0.20* 
Mean confidence 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.17 
Resistance to overconfidencea 0.06 0.04 0.11 -0.11 
Resolution -0.04 0.02 -0.01 -0.16 
Probability Calculation Task     
Mean success rate 0.04 0.02 0.16 -0.13 
Mean confidence 0.02 -0.05 0.00 -0.10 
Resistance to overconfidencea -0.04 0.09 0.18* -0.15 
Resolution 0.00 0.06 0.02 -0.07 
a A higher score indicated better calibration. 
*p < .05. **p < .01.
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and self-reported learning challenges, r(136) = -0.20, p< 0.05, supporting that greater reported 
learning challenges were related to poorer performance. There were no statistically significant 
relationships between confidence and self-perceptions on the financial calculation task (ps > 
0.05). There were also no statistically significant relationships between success rate, confidence, 
and self-perception measures on the probability calculation task (ps > 0.05).  
Contrary to the present’s study initial hypothesis, academic self-concept and cognitive 
test anxiety were not related to indices of monitoring accuracy, across all experimental tasks (ps 
> 0.05). Similarly, self-reported academic average and learning challenges were largely not  
associated with monitoring accuracy indices (ps > 0.05), with the exception of a small 
statistically significant relationship found between self-reported academic average and resistance 
to overconfidence on the probability calculation task, r(136) = 0.18, p < 0.05. 
Predictors of Monitoring Accuracy and Real-World Outcomes 
Two series of regressions analyses were then conducted in order to better understand the 
relationships between monitoring accuracy, its correlates, and real-world monitoring accuracy 
outcomes. The first set of regressions included predicting calibration and resolution from 
cognitive abilities, task-specific judgments, and self-perception variables. The second set of 
regressions included predicting real-world outcomes of academic grades and self-reported 
learning challenges from indices of monitoring accuracy, cognitive abilities, and self-
perceptions. 
Assumptions. Prior to each regression, diagnostic tests were conducted to determine 
whether regressions were a viable procedure. As with all multiple regressions, assumptions of 
independence of observations, linearity, homoscedasticity, absence of multicollinearity, and lack 
of unusual points (i.e., outliers, high leverage point, highly influential points) were verified. 
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Given that each value of the outcome variables came from a separate case, independence of 
observations was assumed. There was also independence of residuals, as assessed by a Durbin-
Watson statistic that ranged from 1.92 – 2.11 across regression analyses. Assumptions of 
linearity (i.e., predictor variables are collectively and independently linearly related to all 
outcome variables), homoscedasticity (i.e., equal residuals for all values of the outcome 
variables), and normally distributed errors (i.e., normal distribution of the residuals) were 
explored graphically, with no violations found. Variance inflation factor (VIF) values of less 
than 10 indicated a lack of multicollinearity. Finally, the absence of unusual points was verified 
(i.e., scores were less than three standard deviations from the mean, leverage values were below 
0.20, and Cook’s Distance values were above 1).  
Predictors of calibration and resolution. Due to their centrality in the present study, 
predictors of calibration and resolution were further explored by using simultaneous regression 
analyses to identify unique predictors of monitoring accuracy. Cognitive abilities (i.e., working 
memory and intelligence composite scores), the various aggregated judgments, and a Self-
Perceptions Raw Composite Score (i.e., summed and standardized cognitive test anxiety and 
academic self-concept scores) were entered as predictors of calibration and resolution on each of 
the monitoring accuracy tasks. The results of these regression analyses appear in Tables 18 and 
19.  
Regression analyses on calibration. Calibration was represented by the resistance to 
overconfidence index, where greater scores indicated better calibration. Regressions analyses to 
predict calibration are summed in Table 19. 
Predicting general knowledge calibration. A multiple regression was run to predict 
resistance to overconfidence on the general knowledge task from cognitive abilities, aggregated 
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pre- and post-task judgment scores, and the self-perceptions raw composite score. The multiple 
regression model statistically significantly predicted resistance to overconfidence on the general 
knowledge task, F(8,126) = 3.16, p =0.003, R2  = 0.17, adjusted R2 = 0.11. Both working 
memory, β = 0.26, p =0.005, and ratings of post-task difficulty, β = 0.26, p =0.04, uniquely 
contributed to predicting resistance to overconfidence, accounting for 6% and 5% of the 
variability in general knowledge calibration, respectively.  
Table 19 
Simultaneous Regression Results for Resistance to Overconfidence 
 
  B SEB  b t Variance 
explained 
Criterion Variable = Resistance to Overconfidencea on General Knowledge Test  
Working memory raw score 0.01 0.00 0.25 2.86 ** 6% 
Intelligence raw composite z-score 0.00 0.01 0.13 1.58 2% 
Predictive confidence judgement -0.01 0.01 -0.13 -1.22 1% 
Postdictive confidence judgement -0.00 0.01 -0.07 -0.58 <1% 
Task difficulty  0.01 0.01 0.22 2.05* 5% 
Effort required -0.00 0.01 -0.03 -0.34 <1% 
Feeling of effort 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.67 <1% 
Self-perceptions raw composite z-score -0.00 0.01 0.02 0.20 <1% 
    Overall Regression: F (8, 126) = 3.16** 
     Multiple R = 0.41 
     Multiple R2 = 0.17 
     Adjusted R2 = 0.11 
Criterion Variable = Resistance to Overconfidencea on Financial Calculation Test 
Working memory raw score .00 0.10 0.10 1.13 <1% 
Intelligence raw composite z-score .02 0.00 0.20 2.13* 4% 
Predictive confidence judgement .01 0.01 0.11 1.03 1% 
Postdictive confidence judgement -0.00 0.01 -0.08 -0.63 <1% 
Task difficulty  -0.00 0.01 -0.06 -0.46 <1% 
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Effort required -0.01 0.01 -0.17 -1.37 3% 
Feeling of effort 0.01 0.01 0.16 1.39 3% 
Self-perceptions raw composite z-score 0.01 0.01 0.12 1.31 1% 
     Overall Regression: F (8, 126) = 1.67 
     Multiple R = 0.31 
     Multiple R2 = 0.10 
     Adjusted R2 = 0.04 
Criterion Variable = Resistance to Overconfidencea on Probability Calculation Test 
Working memory raw score .00 0.00 0.02 0.19 <1% 
Intelligence raw composite z-score .03 0.01 0.30 3.42*** 8% 
Predictive confidence judgement -0.00 0.01 -0.03 -0.24 <1% 
Postdictive confidence judgement -0.00 0.00 -0.09 -0.90 <1% 
Task difficulty  0.01 0.01 0.12 1.03 <1% 
Effort required -0.16 0.01 -0.23 -1.97* 3% 
Feeling of effort 0.17 0.01 0.23 2.42** 5% 
Self-perceptions raw composite z-score -0.01 0.01 0.09 -0.61 <1% 
     Overall Regression: F (8, 126) = 3.35** 
     Multiple R = 0.41 
     Multiple R2 = 0.17 
     Adjusted R2 = 0.12 
Note.B = unstandardized regression coefficient; SEB = standard error of the coefficient; b = 
standardized coefficient.  
a A higher score indicated better calibration.  
*p < .05. **p < .01.  ***p < .001. 
Predicting financial calculation calibration. A similar multiple regression was run to 
predict resistance to overconfidence on the financial calculation task from cognitive abilities, 
aggregated pre- and post-task judgment scores, and the self-perceptions raw composite score. 
The complete regression model did not statistically significantly predict resistance to 
overconfidence on the financial calculation task, F(8, 126) = 1.67 p =0.11. The intelligence 
composite score however did significantly predict resistance to overconfidence, β = 0.20, p 
=0.04, accounting for 4% of the variability in financial calculation calibration.  
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Predicting probability calculation calibration. A multiple regression was run to predict 
resistance to overconfidence on the probability calculation task from cognitive abilities, 
aggregated pre- and post-task judgment scores, and the self-perceptions raw composite score. 
The multiple regression model statistically significantly predicted resistance to overconfidence 
on the probability calculation task, F(8, 126) = 3.25, p = 0.002, R2  = 0.17, adjusted R2 = 0.12. 
The intelligence raw score composite, β = 0.29, p < 0.001, as well as post-task ratings of effort, β 
= -0.23, p = 0.04, and feeling of effort, β = 0.23, p = 0.01, significantly contributed to predicting 
resistance to overconfidence, accounting for 8%, 3%, and 5% of the variability in probability 
calculation calibration, respectively.  
Regression analyses on resolution. Resolution was measured with the Goodman–
Kruskal Gamma, where greater scores indicated a greater ability to discriminate between correct 
versus incorrect responses. Regression analyses to predict resolution are summed in Table 20. 
Predicting general knowledge resolution. A multiple regression was run to predict 
general knowledge resolution from cognitive abilities, aggregated pre- and post-task judgment 
scores, and the self-perceptions raw composite score. The multiple regression model statistically 
significantly predicted general knowledge resolution, F(8,126) = 2.19, p < 0.05, R2  = 0.12, 
adjusted R2 = 0.07. The intelligence raw score composite, β = 0.23, p < 0.01, was the sole 
predictor uniquely contributing to predicting resolution, accounting for 4% of the variability in 
general knowledge resolution. 
Predicting financial calculation resolution. A multiple regression was run to predict 
probability calculation resolution from cognitive abilities, aggregated pre- and post-task 
judgment scores, and the self-perceptions raw composite score. The regression model did not 
statistically significantly predict financial calculation resolution, F(8,126) = 1.42, p = 0.20. 
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Working memory raw scores however did significantly predict financial calculation resolution, β 
= -0.19, p < 0.05, accounting for 4% of the variability.  
Table 20 
Simultaneous Regression Results for Resolution 
 
  B SEB  b t Variance 
explained 
Criterion Variable = Resolution on General Knowledge Test  
Working memory raw score 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.57 <1% 
Intelligence raw composite z-score 0.04 0.02 0.23 2.65** 4% 
Predictive confidence judgement 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.14 <1% 
Postdictive confidence judgement 0.02 0.02 0.13 1.09 <1% 
Task difficulty  -0.02 0.02 -0.06 -0.54 <1% 
Effort required -0.02 0.01 -0.10 -1.01 <1% 
Feeling of effort 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.23 <1% 
Self-perceptions raw composite z-score 0.05 0.02 -0.06 -0.67 <1% 
    Overall Regression: F (8,126) = 2.19* 
     Multiple R = 0.35 
     Multiple R2 = 0.12 
     Adjusted R2 = 0.07 
Criterion Variable = Resolution on Financial Calculation Test 
Working memory raw score -0.20 0.01 -0.19 -2.07* 4% 
Intelligence raw composite z-score 0.10 0.02 0.05 0.49 <1% 
Predictive confidence judgement 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.36 <1% 
Postdictive confidence judgement -0.02 0.01 -0.16 -1.24 3% 
Task difficulty  -0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.13 <1% 
Effort required 0.03 0.02 0.18 1.48 3% 
Feeling of effort -0.02 0.02 -0.10 -0.90 1% 
Self-perceptions raw composite z-score -0.00 0.03 -0.01 -0.06 <1% 
     Overall Regression: F (8,117) = 1.43 
     Multiple R = 0.30 
     Multiple R2 = 0.09 
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     Adjusted R2 = 0.03 
Criterion Variable = Resolution on Probability Calculation Test 
Working memory raw score -0.04 0.01 -0.19 -2.05* 4% 
Intelligence raw composite z-score 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.49 <1% 
Predictive confidence judgement 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.37 <1% 
Postdictive confidence judgement 0.00 0.01 -0.16 -1.25 3% 
Task difficulty  0.00 0.02 -0.02 -0.13 <1% 
Effort required -0.02 0.02 0.18 1.45 3% 
Feeling of effort 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.89 <1% 
Self-perceptions raw composite z-score -0.00 0.03 -0.02 -0.16 <1% 
     Overall Regression: F (8,126) = 1.42 
     Multiple R = 0.29 
     Multiple R2 = 0.09 
     Adjusted R2 = 0.03 
Note.B = unstandardized regression coefficient; SEB = standard error of the coefficient; b = 
standardized coefficient.  
*p < .05. **p < .01.   
Predicting probability calculation resolution. A multiple regression was run to predict 
probability calculation resolution from cognitive abilities, aggregated pre- and post-task 
judgment scores, and the self-perceptions raw composite score. The regression model did not 
statistically significantly predict probability calculation resolution, F(8, 125) = 1.45, p = 0.22. 
Working memory however did significantly predict probability calculation resolution, β = -0.19, 
p < 0.05, accounting for 4% of the variability.  
Taken together, the most consistent predictors of both calibration and resolution were 
cognitive abilities, such that either greater working memory total scores or greater intelligence 
raw composite scores predicted greater resistance to overconfidence and resolution scores, across 
experimental tasks. All other predictors rarely had unique explanatory power. 
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Predictors of real-world outcomes. A second series of multiple regression analyses 
were conducted in order to further explore and identify unique predictors of real-world 
outcomes. Cognitive abilities (i.e., working memory and intelligence composite scores), indices 
of monitoring accuracy on each of the monitoring accuracy tasks (i.e., resistance to 
overconfidence and resolution), and the self-perceptions raw composite score were entered as 
predictors of self-reported academic grades and learning challenges. The results of these 
regression analyses appear in Tables 21 and 22. 
Regression analyses on academic grades. Regressions analyses to predict academic 
grades are summarized in Table 21.  
Table 21 
Simultaneous Regression Results for Academic Grades 
 
  B SEB  b t Variance 
explained 
Regression #1  
Working memory raw score 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.67 <1% 
Intelligence raw composite z-score 0.10 0.05 0.19 2.02* 4% 
Resistance to Overconfidencea on General 
Knowledge Test 
-0.41 0.62 -0.07 -0.79 <1% 
Resolution on the General Knowledge Test 0.07 0.27 0.04 0.48 <1% 
Self-perceptions raw composite z-score 0.04 0.07 -0.04 -0.42 <1% 
    Overall Regression: F (5, 123) = 1.08 
     Multiple R = 0.21 
     Multiple R2 = 0.04 
     Adjusted R2 = 0.03 
Regression #2  
Working memory raw score 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.14 <1% 
Intelligence raw composite z-score 0.02 0.01 0.19 1.98* 4% 
Resistance to Overconfidencea on the 
Financial Calculation Test 
0.50 0.65 0.07 0.78 <1% 
Resolution on the Financial Calculation Test -0.00 0.24 -0.00 -0.02 <1% 
Self-perceptions raw composite z-score -0.02 0.07 -0.02 -0.25 <1% 
     Overall Regression: F (5,115) = 1.32 
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     Multiple R = 0.23 
     Multiple R2 = 0.05 
     Adjusted R2 = 0.01 
Regression #3  
Working memory raw score 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.41 <1% 
Intelligence raw composite z-score 0.09 0.05 0.16 1.99* 3% 
Resistance to Overconfidencea on the 
Probability Calculation Test 
0.93 0.60 0.14 1.54 2% 
Resolution on the Probability Calculation Test -0.14 0.25 -0.05 -0.56 <1% 
Self-perceptions raw composite z-score -0.03 0.07 -0.04 -0.49 <1% 
     Overall Regression: F (5, 123) = 1.55 
     Multiple R = 0.24 
     Multiple R2 = 0.06 
     Adjusted R2 = 0.02 
Note.B = unstandardized regression coefficient; SEB = standard error of the coefficient; b = 
standardized coefficient.  
a A higher score indicated better calibration. 
*p < .05. **p < .01.   
Predicting academic grades from general knowledge task. A multiple regression was run 
to predict academic grades from cognitive abilities, indices of monitoring accuracy from the 
general knowledge task, and the self-perception raw composite score. The regression model was 
not statistically significant, F(5, 123) = 1.07, p = 0.38. However, the intelligence raw score 
composite, β = .19, p < 0.05 significantly contributed to academic grades, accounting for 3% of 
the variability.  
Predicting academic grades from financial calculation task. A multiple regression was 
run to predict academic average from cognitive abilities, indices of financial calculation 
monitoring accuracy, and self-perception raw composite scores. The regression model was not 
statistically significant, F(5, 123) = 1.10, p = 0.36. Intelligence raw composite scores however 
did significantly contribute to predicting academic grades, β = 0.19, p < 0.05, accounting for 4% 
of the variability.  
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Predicting academic grades from probability calculation task. A multiple regression was 
run to predict academic average from cognitive abilities, indices of probability calculation 
monitoring accuracy, and self-perception raw composite scores. The regression model was not 
statistically significant, F(5, 123) = 1.55, p = 0.18. Intelligence raw composite scores however 
did significantly contribute to predicting academic grades, β = 0.16, p < 0.05, accounting for 3% 
of the variability. 
Across regression analyses, only the intelligence raw composite scores emerged as a 
significant predictor of academic grades.  
Regression analyses on learning challenges. Regression analyses to predict self-reported 
learning challenges are summarized in Table 22.  
Table 22 
Simultaneous Regression Results for Learning Challenges 
 
  B SEB  b t Variance 
explained 
Regression #1 
Working memory raw score -0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.10 <1% 
Intelligence raw composite z-score -0.02 0.00 -0.16 -1.85 2% 
Resistance to Overconfidencea on the 
General Knowledge Test 
0.37 0.47 0.07 0.78 <1% 
Resolution on the General Knowledge Test -0.28 0.20 -0.12 -1.39 2% 
Self-perceptions raw composite z-score -0.16 0.05 -0.26 -3.09** 7% 
    Overall Regression: F (5,126) = 1.96 
     Multiple R = 0.27 
     Multiple R2 = 0.07 
     Adjusted R2 = 0.04 
Regression #2 
Working memory raw score 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.51 <1% 
Intelligence raw composite z-score -0.02 0.01 -0.18 -1.97 3% 
Resistance to Overconfidencea on the 
Financial Calculation Test 
-0.35 0.49 -0.06 -0.71 <1% 
Resolution on the Financial Calculation Test 0.34 0.18 0.17 1.92 3% 
Self-perceptions raw composite z-score -0.16 0.06 -0.26 -2.92** 7% 
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     Overall Regression: F (5, 115) = 3.60** 
     Multiple R = 0.37 
     Multiple R2 = 0.14 
     Adjusted R2 = 0.10 
Regression #3 
Working memory raw score 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.27 <1% 
Intelligence raw composite z-score -0.01 0.04 0.00 -1.67 2% 
Resistance to Overconfidencea on the 
Probability Calculation Test 
-0.47 0.48 -0.09 -1.01 <1% 
Resolution on the Probability Calculation Test -0.05 0.20 -0.02 -0.24 <1% 
Self-perceptions raw composite z-score -0.16 0.05 -0.25 -2.90** 6% 
     Overall Regression: F (5, 124) = 2.99* 
     Multiple R = 0.33 
     Multiple R2 = 0.11 
     Adjusted R2 = 0.07 
Note. B = unstandardized regression coefficient; SEB = standard error of the coefficient; b = 
standardized coefficient.  
aA higher score indicated better calibration.  
*p < .05.   
Predicting learning challenges from general knowledge task. A multiple regression was 
run to predict learning challenges from cognitive abilities, indices of general knowledge 
monitoring accuracy, and self-perception raw composite scores. The regression model was 
statistically significant, F(5, 125) = 3.52, p <0.05. The self-perceptions raw score composite, β = 
-0.26, p < 0.01, was the sole predictor of learning challenges, accounting for 7% of the 
variability.  
 Predicting learning challenges from financial calculation task. A multiple regression was 
run to predict learning challenges from cognitive abilities, indices of financial calculation 
monitoring accuracy, and self-perception raw composite scores. The regression model was 
statistically significant, F(5, 115) = 3.60, p <0.01. The self-perceptions raw score composite, β = 
-0.26, p < 0.01, was the sole predictor of learning challenges, accounting for 7% of the 
variability. 
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Predicting learning challenges from probability calculation task. A multiple regression 
was run to predict learning challenges from cognitive abilities, indices of probability calculation 
monitoring accuracy, and self-perception raw composite scores. The regression model was 
statistically significant, F(5, 124) = 2.99, p <.01. The self-perceptions raw score composite, β = -
0.25, p < 0.01, was the sole predictor of learning challenges, accounting for 7% of the variability. 
Across analyses, findings support that cognitive abilities, specifically the intelligence raw 
composite score, were the most consistent predictor of academic grades, whereas individual 
differences in self-perceptions was the most significant predictor of learning challenges. All 
other predictors did not emerge as statistically significant.  
Discussion 
The present study examined individuals’ monitoring accuracy across three tasks from 
different domains. In addition to general knowledge, two of the tasks used have been rarely 
examined from a metacognitive perspective: financial calculation and probability calculation. 
The association between them, and the well-studied general knowledge domain extends the 
existing literature on understanding the stability of monitoring accuracy, both within individuals 
and across domains.  
Four aims were considered: (1) exploring indices of monitoring accuracy across domains; 
(2) investigating whether monitoring accuracy scores reflect domain-general or domain-specific 
abilities; (3) exploring potential correlates as well as predictors of success, confidence and 
monitoring accuracy, including cognitive abilities, task-specific judgments, and self-perceptions; 
and (4) examining the relationship between monitoring accuracy and real-world outcomes of 
academic achievement and learning challenges. Overall, an overconfidence bias was found in all 
experimental tasks. Calibration scores were also correlated across tasks, suggesting domain-
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generality. In contrast, although reliable resolution was obtained in all tasks, resolution was not 
correlated across tasks, suggesting domain-specificity of discrimination abilities. Associations 
between task-specific judgments, self-perceptions, and monitoring accuracy indices varied across 
tasks. Cognitive abilities were the sole consistent predictor of both calibration and resolution. In 
this study, monitoring accuracy did not predict real-world achievement and learning outcomes. 
However, cognitive abilities emerged as a predictor of academic grades, whereas self-
perceptions predicted learning difficulties. A summary of research aims, hypotheses, and 
findings are presented in Table 23 and discussed below.  
Performance, Confidence, and Monitoring Accuracy  
 The first goal of the present study was to compare calibration and resolution within 
experimental tasks. In all three tasks, confidence was not well matched with performance, with a 
tendency towards over- rather than underconfidence. Participants’ confidence in their task 
performance was therefore greater than their actual performance. This finding is consistent with 
the overconfidence effect reported in many domains (Dunning, Heath, & Suls, 2004), including 
the judgment and decision-making literature (Bruine de Bruine et al., 2007; Lichtenstein & 
Fischhoff, 1977; Stanovich et al., 2016; West & Stanovich, 1997; Yates, Lee & Bush, 1997). 
Resistance to overconfidence and accuracy were also found to be positively related, such that in 
each task, better performance was associated with better calibration. Increased success on task 
items was therefore associated with an increased ability to estimate actual performance. In 
contrast, resistance to overconfidence and confidence demonstrated a negative relationship, with 
poorer confidence being associated with better calibration (except for the financial calculation 
task, which was nonsignificant). This negative association between confidence and calibration 
can be best understood in the context of the overconfidence effect. If individuals are in fact prone  
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Table 23 
Summary of Study Aims, Hypotheses, and Results 
Aims Hypotheses 
Results 
General 
Knowledge 
Financial 
Calculation 
Probability 
Calculation 
Indices of 
Monitoring 
Accuracy 
Hypothesis 1: Overconfidence bias across all tasks X X X 
Hypothesis 2. Resolution greater than zero across all tasks X X X 
Domain-
Generality vs 
Domain-
Specificity 
Hypothesis 3a. Calibration scores correlated across tasks X X X 
Hypothesis 3b. Calibration scores between similar domains 
reflect stronger correlations  X X 
Hypothesis 4. Resolution scores correlated across tasks.    
Success, 
Confidence, and 
Monitoring 
Accuracy 
Correlates 
Hypothesis 5. Cognitive abilities associated with increased 
calibration and resolution X X X 
Hypothesis 6a. Predictive confidence positively correlated with:     
• accuracy 
• confidence 
 X X 
X X X 
Hypothesis 6b. Postdictive confidence positively correlated with 
accuracy and confidence 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
Hypothesis 7. Poorer calibration associated with:     
• higher confidence  
• increased difficulty 
• required effort 
• feeling of effort 
X  X 
X   
   
  X 
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Hypothesis 8. Poorer resolution associated with:     
• higher confidence  
• increased difficulty 
• required effort 
• feeling of effort 
X X  
X   
 X  
   
Hypothesis 9. Poorer calibration associated with poorer 
academic self-concept and increased cognitive anxiety    
Hypothesis 10. Poorer resolution scores associated with poorer 
academic self-concept and increased cognitive anxiety    
Hypothesis 11. Academic self-concept and cognitive anxiety 
positively correlated X X X 
Hypothesis 12. Cognitive abilities, task-specific judgments, and 
self-perceptions predict calibration scores 
Cognitive 
abilities and 
difficulty 
ratings only 
Cognitive 
abilities only 
Cognitive 
abilities, effort, 
and feeling of 
effort only 
Hypothesis 13. Cognitive abilities, task-specific judgments, and 
self-perceptions predict resolution scores 
Cognitive 
abilities only 
Cognitive 
abilities only 
Cognitive abilities 
only 
Real-World 
Outcomes 
Hypothesis 14. Poorer calibration associated with lower grades 
and greater learning problems   
Academic 
average only 
Hypothesis 15. Poorer resolution associated with lower grades 
and greater learning problems.    
Hypothesis 16a. Indices of monitoring accuracy, cognitive 
abilities, and self-perceptions predict academic achievement  
Cognitive 
abilities only 
Cognitive 
abilities only 
Cognitive abilities 
only 
 Hypothesis 16b. Indices of monitoring accuracy, cognitive abilities, and self-perceptions predict learning challenges 
Self-
perceptions 
only 
Self-
perceptions 
only 
Self-perceptions 
only 
Note. X indicates a significant finding.  
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to overestimating their knowledge, then it makes sense that lower confidence ratings are actually 
better matched with objective performance. In support of this explanation, a study by Koriat 
(1980) in which participants confidence judgments were experimentally manipulated, found that 
a decrease in mean confidence was better matched with mean performance, thus leading to 
improved calibration scores.  
 In addition, reliable resolution was found across all three tasks, as indicated by mean 
resolution scores being significantly different from zero. This supports that participants were 
meaningfully using the confidence scale and were able to successfully discriminate between 
correct and incorrect responses. However, associations between resolution, accuracy, and 
confidence varied across tasks. Thus, in contrast to calibration, resolution did not demonstrate a 
consistent pattern from one task to another. The finding that each task in isolation showed 
reliable resolution strengthens the inference of domain-specificity in resolution that emerged 
across tasks (Jackson et al., 2016).  
 There were no correlations between calibration and resolution in either the general 
knowledge or financial calculation tasks. Calibration and resolution were significantly positively 
correlated in the probability calculation task, although this effect was small. The ability to judge 
actual performance was therefore not consistently related to the ability to discriminate between 
correct and incorrect responses across tasks. Consequently, individuals may be able to assess 
when, for example, knowledge prior to an exam is poor and that they must study in order to 
increase performance (i.e., good calibration), yet not be able to discriminate between which parts 
of the material they have internalized, versus which parts would require more review (i.e., no 
resolution). This distinction between calibration and resolution is of importance when wanting to 
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target metacognitive abilities, suggesting that different indices of monitoring accuracy may 
warrant different levels of intervention and support.  
Domain-General Calibration, Domain-Specific Resolution  
 A second study goal was to explore the question of whether metacognitive monitoring 
represents a general ability, similar across domains, or rather a specific ability that varies as a 
function of domain considered. Overall, calibration was significantly and positively correlated 
across experimental tasks, which suggests domain-generality. This finding further supports 
previous studies showing that calibration is a domain-general construct, reflecting a stable 
individual difference trait (Jackson & Kleitman, 2014; 2016; Stanovich & West, 1997).  
 Nonetheless, correlations between calculation tasks were stronger, compared to 
correlations between general knowledge and either financial or probability calculations. There 
was also a significant difference between correlation coefficients with the general knowledge 
task, then with the numeracy-based tasks. Thus, although calibration demonstrated domain-
generality, there may be some sensitivity to task domain. That is, tasks in which the underlying 
content knowledge is more closely related may display more analogous calibration abilities, 
compared to tasks that rely on different knowledge bases (e.g., general knowledge versus 
calculations). The idea that the strength of relatedness, rather than its existence, can vary across 
knowledge domains may help consolidate inconsistent findings in the literature which support 
both domain-generality (e.g., Erickson & Heit, 2015; Scott & Berman, 2013; Veenman and 
Verheij, 2001) and domain-specificity (e.g., Fitzgerald, Arvaneh, & Dockree, 2017; Glaser, 
1991). A series of studies exploring monitoring accuracy across various domains conducted by 
Schraw and colleagues (1995) lends some support to this view. In the first experiment of this 
study, Schraw and colleagues (1995) used experimental tasks of more diverse domains, whereas 
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in the second experiment task knowledge and content were more closely related. Although 
authors concluded a general tendency for domain-generality of confidence, they noted that 
correlations between similar tasks were stronger, compared to those reflecting a more diverse set 
of content knowledge (Schraw et al., 1995). An interaction between person-related factors and 
content knowledge was therefore proposed, in which domain-general processes may support 
domain-specific performance (Schraw et al., 1995). That is, although calibration abilities display 
a similar pattern across diverse domains, individual expertise in domain considered may impact 
this general metacognitive trait.  
 In contrast, there was a lack of correlations in resolution, across experimental tasks. The 
ability to discriminate between correct and incorrect responses on one task was therefore not 
related to the ability to discriminate between correct and incorrect responses on another task. 
Given that previous studies have compared resolution across sets of similar tasks (Ackerman & 
Beller, 2007; Finn & Metcalfe, 2008), findings from the present study suggest that when tasks 
are diverse, resolution might be domain-specific, rather than general. That is, the same individual 
may have strong resolution abilities on a general knowledge task, but less on a calculation task. 
This further supports that, in contrast to calibration, the ability to discriminate right from wrong 
answers may vary across tasks (Jackson, Kleitman, Howie, & Stankov, 2016). This distinction  
reinforces previous claims that calibration and resolution are conceptually different and 
empirically separable indicators of monitoring accuracy (Ais, Zylberberg, Barttfeld, & Sigman, 
2016; Koriat et al. 2002; Koriat, 2012b; Maki et al., 2005; Thiede et al., 2015) and can yield 
important insights into interventions targeting metacognitive skill and development. For 
example, if the goal is to increase general metacognitive accuracy skills, calibration abilities 
should be targeted and supported, as they can apply across areas. In contrast, if the goal is to 
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increase performance in a given domain, discrimination skills relating to specific content 
knowledge should be the goal. Calibration and resolution are therefore complementary measures, 
both critical for determining effective effort regulation (see Ackerman, Parush, Nassar, & Shtub, 
2016, for a review).  
 Taken together, study findings support that calibration is a person-centered, domain 
general metacognitive ability that is relatively consistent across areas. In contrast, resolution 
represents a domain-specific ability, sensitive to content knowledge and task demands. The 
assessment of monitoring accuracy is therefore contingent on the metric used for assessment. 
Calibration is a measure of absolute accuracy, representing metacognitive precision, whereas 
resolution is a measure of relative accuracy, reflecting metacognitive consistency (Schraw, 
2009). As such, an individual’s performance may be precise yet inconsistent, and vice versa, 
with both metrics impacting accuracy and performance. A highly accurate individual would need 
to possess well-developed abilities across both indices of calibration and resolution. Considering 
these findings, both domain-specific and domain-general processes seem to be in operation when 
preforming in different domains (Schraw et al., 1995).  
Cognitive Abilities Associated with and Predictive of Monitoring Accuracy 
 A third goal of the current study was to explore various potential correlates of success, 
confidence, and monitoring accuracy. In general, there was a positive relation between cognitive 
abilities (either working memory and/or intelligence composite score) and accuracy, calibration, 
and resolution. That is, participants with greater cognitive abilities were not only more successful 
on tasks items, but were also better able to estimate their performance and to discriminate 
between correct versus incorrect responses. These findings corroborate previous research linking 
both general knowledge and calculation skills with increased intelligence (Stanovich & West, 
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1998; Peters & Bjalkerbring, 2015) and can be attributed to mechanisms of cognitive decoupling 
(Stanovich, 2011). Cognitive decoupling requires individuals to simulate alternative worlds and 
to consider hypothetical scenarios that are not in the immediate environment, necessitating 
engagement of analytic processes to construct these scenarios. However, cognitive decoupling 
can be challenging to achieve as decoupling mechanisms must be continuously ongoing and 
demand that mental simulations be sustained while keeping hypothetical scenarios decoupled 
(Stanovich, 2011). For these reasons, better decoupling abilities can be indexed with measures of 
working memory and intellectual abilities (Stanovich, 2011; West & Stanovich, 1997). The 
current study supports that monitoring accuracy requires some cognitive decoupling, as 
monitoring accuracy also requires simulating and hypothetical reasoning in order to best evaluate 
current states of knowledge. Some cognitive decoupling may therefore be required to achieve 
better monitoring accuracy, which supports the association between increased monitoring 
accuracy and cognitive abilities.   
 Intelligence raw composite scores were also positively associated with greater 
confidence. However, the relationship between confidence and intelligence varied depending on 
task. That is, confidence on the general knowledge task was positively associated with verbal, 
rather than nonverbal abilities. In contrast, confidence on both financial and probability 
calculation tasks were positively associated with nonverbal, rather than verbal abilities. These 
findings further support that, as designed, tasks developed for this study tapped into diverse 
domains, such that general knowledge may have relied more heavily on crystalized abilities, 
whereas calculation tasks may have required greater fluid reasoning abilities (Shipley et al., 
2009).  
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 When exploring potential monitoring accuracy predictors, cognitive abilities emerged as 
a statistically significant variable. Across all experimental tasks, higher cognitive abilities 
predicted better calibration. These findings are consistent with other empirical studies that have 
examined overconfidence (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Stanovich & West, 1998; Stanovich et 
al., 2016). Similarly, across all experimental tasks, higher cognitive abilities predicted better 
resolution, congruent with previous research supporting the relationship between intelligence and 
the ability to successfully discriminate between correct versus incorrect responses (Jackson & 
Kleitman, 2014). Overall, better cognitive abilities were associated with, and predictive of, better 
performance and monitoring accuracy.  
Predictive and Postdictive Confidence, Difficulty, and Effort 
 A second set of potential correlates explored in the current study were task-specific 
judgments, including pre-and postdictive confidence judgments and post-task ratings of 
difficulty, effort required, and feeling of effort.  
 Across tasks, predictive and postdictive judgments were positively correlated to both 
confidence and accuracy. This corroborates previous findings positively linking predictive and 
postdictive judgments of performance to increased accuracy, across a variety of domains 
(Erikson & Heit, 2015). The relationships between confidence and post-task ratings were also 
similar across tasks, with greater confidence being negatively associated with task difficulty, 
effort required, and feeling of effort. That is, the more confident in performance, the less difficult 
and effortful the task was experienced. Ackerman and Zalmanov (2012) demonstrated that 
quickly produced answers, such as in the case of multiple choice responses, are generally 
accompanied by higher confidence ratings. Building on this finding, it can be suggested that 
rapidly generated responses are also perceived as less difficult and less effortful.   
 
 
 
89	
 In contrast, there were no clear patterns that emerged in the relationships between 
accuracy and post-task ratings of difficulty, effort, and feeling of effort. The one exception was 
that across both financial and probability calculation tasks, success rate was negatively 
associated to perceptions of effort. That is, poorer accuracy on calculation items, but not on 
general knowledge items, was related to increased perceived effort. It can be hypothesized that 
increased effort exertion on calculation items was experienced as a result of the computational 
demands of these tasks. Responses on the general knowledge task relied on memory retrieval 
processes, whereas responses on the calculation task required additional computational skills and 
response generation. 
 Across domains, overall task-specific judgments did not emerge as predictors of 
monitoring accuracy. Two exceptions to this trend included ratings of task difficulty on the 
general knowledge task, as well as ratings of perceived effort and feeling of effort on the 
probability task, emerging as predictors of calibration. These findings suggest that perceived 
workload and effort required may importantly bear on monitoring accuracy in certain domains. 
The NASA Task Load Index (TLX; Hart & Staveland, 1988) has been used to index individual 
differences in perceived workload, which may be useful to include in future studies, to better our 
understanding of this potential association.  
Academic Self-Concept and Cognitive Test Anxiety 
 A final set of potential monitoring accuracy correlates explored in this study included 
individual self-perceptions of academic self-concept and cognitive test anxiety. Contrary to 
initial hypotheses, no significant correlations were found between self-perceptions and 
monitoring accuracy. Previous studies however have suggested that cognitive biases negatively 
impact individual confidence levels (Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980). In a study by 
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Erickson (2015), it was found that math anxiety becomes disruptive to metacognitive processes 
as a function of task difficulty, with easier tasks being less disruptive. Considering the overall 
success rate of present study tasks (general knowledge = 53.19%, financial calculation = 62.99%, 
probability calculation = 58.89%), it can be hypothesized that the impact of cognitive test anxiety 
may have emerged with more complex and difficult tasks. Furthermore, disposition measures 
explored in this study were narrowed, targeting self-perceptions about a particular task type (i.e., 
test-taking) and domain (i.e., academics). Perhaps an inclusion of broader considerations would 
have yielded different results. For example, in a study by Erickson (2015) focused on math 
anxiety, it was suggested that considering a less specific view of anxiety, such as generalized 
anxiety, would better capture the effect of anxiety on metacognitive abilities, particularly through 
its association with decreased working memory.    
Real-World Outcomes: Academic Achievement and Learning Challenges 
 A final study goal was to explore monitoring accuracy, cognitive abilities, and self-
perceptions as potential predictors of real-world outcomes of academic grades and learning 
challenges. Across experimental tasks, intelligence predicted academic grades, showing that 
higher intelligence was correlated with higher academic average. Neither calibration, resolution, 
nor self-perceptions however emerged as predictors of academic grades. Regarding learning 
challenges, only self-perceptions emerged as a significant predictor of self-reported difficulties. 
This finding is in line with previous literature supporting that poorer self-perceptions and self-
efficacy beliefs negatively impact learning (Stankov et al., 2012).  
 However, contrary to initial hypotheses, indices of monitoring accuracy did not 
significantly predict any of the real-world outcomes considered in this study. Studies that have 
explored real-world consequences of monitoring accuracy have largely focused on decision-
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making, such as composite scores that include a diverse set of real world outcomes, such as 
whether to throw out food or have a mortgage or loan foreclosed (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). 
These studies have found that poorer monitoring accuracy leads to poorer outcomes. Perhaps a 
consideration related to achievement or learning-related outcomes may be associated with 
variables pertaining to conscientious behaviours, such as whether to seek additional support, 
attend lectures, or investment of more study time. It can be hypothesized that if individuals are 
overconfident in their academic and learning abilities or unable to discriminate between areas in 
which they have mastered knowledge and those they have not, that in turn they would be less 
likely to engage in choices and behaviours that would favor the improvement of their learning 
and performance.   
 Taken together, present findings suggest that when wanting to identify individuals with 
poorer academic grades or learning difficulties, indices of monitoring accuracy may not be the 
most ideal variables to consider. Nonetheless, it is important to note that both academic average 
and learning challenges in this present study were self-reported and identified. Given that the 
study sample showed a tendency towards overconfidence, individuals may have not accurately 
reported their learning difficulties, thus masking results. Future studies should consider more 
objective measures of both grades and learning difficulties.  
Limitations, Implications, and Future Directions 
Limitations.  
 Calculating indices. Methodological and scoring considerations of monitoring accuracy 
indices should be taken into account. In the resolution literature, variability in item difficulty is 
critically important, but this screening is not used in the overconfidence literature. To be able to 
calculate the gamma index and whether a participant can discriminate between correct and 
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incorrect items, there needs to be variability in confidence judgments, such as assigning high 
confidence to correct responses and low confidence to incorrect responses (Fleming & Lau, 
2014). If, for example, a participant assigns high confidence to all responses, not only is there 
lack of variability, but this response pattern can also suggest that the participant is not using the 
confidence scale meaningfully and is assigning arbitrary judgments. When calculating 
calibration however, this is less of a methodological concern, as the overconfidence formula does 
not require variability to be interpreted meaningfully. In the context of calibration, it is possible 
that a participant assigns high or low confidence ratings to all responses, due to a strong over- or 
underconfidence bias.  
 In order to use the same set of responses and participants, and directly compare findings 
across accuracy monitoring indices, the current study eliminated items that had very low or very 
high success rates (see Tables 2, 4, and 6). To our knowledge, this is the first study to directly 
and empirically compare calibration and resolution indices to address issues of domain-
generality versus specificity. What was considered the most conservative approach was used, in 
order to directly compare these indices, and demonstrates the feasibility of this experimental 
strategy.  
 Another potential approach to comparing calibration and resolution could have been with 
the use of hybrid scores. In order to target calculation differences between absolute (i.e., 
calibration) and relative (i.e., resolution) accuracy, some researchers have proposed the use of 
hybrid indices (Schraw, 1990), such as the Brier score (Karen, 1991; Yates, 1990). Considering 
findings from this study that elucidate critical differences between calibration and resolution, the 
use of a synthesized score may have led to unrepresentative findings (Schraw, 1990). Evidenced 
by the current study, calibration and resolution reflect very different metacognitive monitoring 
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processes and should be considered separately. Future studies should aim for a more in-depth 
consideration of issues relating to scoring criteria, inclusion and exclusion of items, and choice 
of metacognitive indices, which may have important implications.  
Sample size. A second limitation of the current study is the sample size considering the 
number of completed analyses. Given the novelty of our research question and methodology, 
current hypotheses needed to be approached in a systematic way. That is, the first step was to 
replicate findings (i.e., significant overconfidence and resolution) and establish the current study 
as being consistent with the existing literature. The second step was to then build on findings and 
empirically explore issues of domain generality and specificity. As a result of this dual approach, 
a greater number of hypotheses and analyses were conducted. In order to circumvent this 
potential issue of sample size, a Bonferroni correction was applied to our targeted aim of cross-
domain index comparison (see Tables 10 and 11) and findings remained significant. For other 
exploratory analyses, effect sizes rather than p values can be used when interpreting results, as 
effect sizes are independent of sample size (Kline, 2005). Future research may wish to include an 
a priori power analysis in order to support sample size choice.  
Another potential sample-related issue is the predominantly female sex distribution of the 
current sample. The current study did not find any sex differences in monitoring accuracy, 
although this finding may have been impacted by the skewed female sample. Future studies 
should aim for a more even distribution and further explore any potential sex differences.  
 Item difficulty. A third consideration critical for future studies would be that of item 
difficulty. Difficulty can impact confidence ratings, such that individuals tend to be 
underconfident in easy questions and overconfident in harder questions (Juslin et al., 2000). One 
of the main reasons why domain-generality has been less explored within the literature is the 
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challenge in designing experimental tasks from differing domains that have items of similar 
difficulty. Although the current study developed tasks that were close in difficulty, thus 
providing evidence that that inter-domain comparisons are possible, continued efforts to control 
for item difficulty will be of importance in future comparisons. Furthermore, given the above-
described methodological challenges of calculating indices of calibration and resolution, 
consideration of not only similar item difficulty between domains, but also of similar variability 
will be of importance.  
 General knowledge task reliability. In the current study, the general knowledge task 
yielded low internal consistency. Future studies can improve on issues of task reliability by 
including a larger set of general knowledge task items and by increased piloting of items. 
 Small variance explained. Although significant predictors did emerge when predicting 
monitoring accuracy indices, resulting variance explained were small. Future research may wish 
to include other potential predictors of monitoring accuracy.  
 Task format. Monitoring accuracy can be sensitive to test format, such that open-ended 
responses may yield different results, compared to multiple choice. In a multiple-choice format, 
participants have greater opportunity to consider each response option, to recognize a correct 
response or to successfully guess the correct answer (Ackerman, 2019). In contrast, open-ended 
questions offer less potential response cues. Given that this study is one of the first to explore 
domain generality and specify not only within domains but also across, it would be of value to 
extend findings and to replicate across test formats, in order to further support that calibration is 
a domain-general, person-centered trait, whereas resolution is a domain-specific and knowledge-
dependent ability.  
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  Trial effects. Indices of monitoring accuracy were explored within a single trial 
experiment. Some research indicates that there may be a “trial effect,” such that confidence 
judgments are sensitive to test-retest scenarios (Koriat et al, 2002). In particular, Koriat and 
colleagues (2002) found that whereas calibration decreases with practice, resolution, in contrast, 
increases. Future studies should build upon the findings of this study and explore domain 
generality and specificity not only across domains, but also across time points.  
Implications. 
Theoretical implications. Meta-reasoning involves the monitoring and control of 
reasoning and problem-solving, such as those captured by the cognitive demands of the current 
study tasks. In a review by Ackerman and Thompson (2017), a Meta-Reasoning framework 
synthesizing the existing literature was proposed (see Figure 6). In their model, Ackerman and 
Thompson (2017) distinguished between object-level processes, as captured by the left column 
of the model, and meta-level processes, as captured by the middle and right columns of the 
model. Object-level processes are responsible for basic cognitive activities, such as perceiving, 
remembering, planning, and classifying, whereas meta-level processes are responsible for 
governing object-level processes by (1) monitoring their function (i.e., metacognitive 
monitoring; middle column of model) and (2) allocating resources when required (i.e., 
metacognitive control; right column of model). Monitoring accuracy is considered to be a 
measure of metacognitive monitoring (Ackerman & Thompson, 2017; Bjork, Dunlosky, & 
Kornell, 2013; Nelson & Narens, 1980), thus captured by the middle column. Given this model, 
a subsequent consideration is how do findings from the current study fit into this proposed 
model, and what may be some points of convergence and divergence.  
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Figure 6. Proposed Meta-Reasoning Framework. Reprinted from Ackerman, R., & Thompson, 
V. A. (2017). Meta-reasoning: Monitoring and control of thinking and reasoning. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 21(8), 607-617. 
Predictive and postdictive confidence judgments in the current study can somewhat be 
likened to the initial and final judgments of solvability. Judgments of solvability are defined as 
the subjective probability that a problem is solvable, with the initial judgment being made from 
the first impression, and the final judgment being made after working on the problem (Ackerman 
& Thompson, 2017). A main difference however is that the predictive and postdictive judgments 
from the current study represent aggregate ratings, rather than item-specific ratings. Aggregate 
judgments are conceptually different from judgments made immediately before, during, or after 
an item is complete, as various cognitive factors are employed to pool together and reflect on 
aggregate performance (Thiede et al., 2005; Veenman et al., 2006). In addition, predictive and 
postdictive judgments from our study assessed participants’ confidence in their overall 
performance ability within a particular domain (e.g. “How confident are you in your ability to 
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correctly solve general knowledge questions?”)  rather than their confidence in being able to 
solve a specific problem. This assessment of overall ability in a certain knowledge area taps into 
the cue-utilization view of metacognition, which states that judgments are the result of inferences 
based on a number of cues derived from beliefs about the self, prior knowledge about the topic 
area, and previous task-specific experience (Koriat, 1997). That is, when participants judge their 
ability to correctly solve, for example, general knowledge questions, beliefs about their personal 
abilities, knowledge, and previous experience with general knowledge problems are accessed 
and used to form an aggregate confidence judgment (Ackerman & Goldsmith, 2011; Koriat, 
1997). Thus, findings from the current study suggest that the middle monitoring column of the 
Meta-Reasoning Framework also include aggregate judgments. It can be hypothesized that these 
aggregate impressions also impact subsequent control processes from the right column, such as 
whether or not to engage in problem-solving, or whether to seek outside support. For example, if 
overall knowledge in financial investments is judged as poor, an individual might seek out 
additional resources, such as advice from their financial institution. In contrast, if overall 
knowledge is judged as sufficient, this behavior may not be engaged in, regardless of whether or 
not it is objectively needed. Thus, aggregate judgments of knowledge and performance play a 
role not only in the monitoring of object-level cognitive processes, but also in the subsequent 
control mechanisms related to resource allocation and behavioral response.   
Regarding monitoring accuracy indices, calibration and resolution are best captured by 
the final confidence in the proposed model, as both represent the subjective probability that the 
final response to a problem is correct. However, the current study supports that although 
calibration and resolution are both indicators of monitoring accuracy, these measures are 
dissociable and represent different aspects of metacognitive monitoring. Feeling of error from 
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the model does not quite capture relative accuracy, as it reflects the subjective feeling that an 
error was made (Ackerman & Thompson, 2017), as opposed to the ability to discriminate 
between correct and incorrect responses. One reason why differentiating monitoring accuracy 
indices within this model is important can be related to the diverse feedback effect that control 
strategies can have on each index. For example, in the context of practice and increased exposure 
to a problem, studies have shown that calibration becomes increasingly impaired, while 
resolution improves (Koriat, 1997, 2002). This difference in outcome further supports that there 
may be distinct cognitive processes that underlie calibration and resolution, such that these 
indices need to be separately considered and interpreted.  
A final point regarding Ackerman And Thompson’s (2017) Meta-Reasoning Framework 
would be the inclusion of individual difference variables, as the current study has shown how 
these may be associated with meta-reasoning. For example, cognitive abilities were not only 
positively correlated with monitoring accuracy, but also emerged as a predictor of monitoring 
accuracy, across both calibration and resolution. Perceived workload and effort required may 
also importantly bear in certain domains, as evidenced by present findings. These individual-
level variables can have critical implications for control processes. Individuals can vary in their 
engagement with effortful and cognitively-demanding tasks and subsequently how much 
resources they allocate to such tasks (Hart & Staveland, 1988; Hsu et al., 2017). As such, 
monitoring accuracy is not only impacted by online, cognitive processes, but also by individual 
and trait-based variables. Historically, the process-based literature and individual differences 
literature have evolved separately; the current study proposes that in order to gain a better 
understanding of how cognitive processes and individual differences influence monitoring 
accuracy and subsequent control and regulation strategies, both lines of research be integrated.  
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Overall, findings from the current study support the proposed Meta-Reasoning 
Framework, with some minor differences. Specifically, the model is generally task-specific, 
capturing monitoring processes on a task and item-level. Theoretical modifications suggested by 
present study findings include a consideration of aggregate judgments, a clear differentiation 
between indices of calibration and resolution, and an inclusion of individual difference variables.    
Translational implications. Beyond theory, findings from the current study also provide 
important implications for real-world contexts, such as metacognitive training and intervention, 
as well as implications directly concerned with education, particularly in the context of math.   
Metacognitive training and intervention. Considering that the overconfidence effect was 
a robust finding, present across domains, it will be important to further support individuals in 
better monitoring their knowledge. Individuals’ subjective confidence directly influences the 
decisions they make, the effort they invest, and whether to seek additional information. In high 
stakes domains like financial literacy, miscalibration can have large and long-lasting 
consequences, such as making poor investments or overestimating one’s ability to manage 
increased debt. Studies have shown that metacognitive training can be beneficial in targeting 
accuracy, particularly for low-achieving groups (Cardell-Ellawar, 1995; Krugger& Denning, 
1999), which are the most vulnerable for poor decision-making and potential long-lasting 
negative consequences. Metacognitive training typically involves improved strategy use, 
checking behavior, problem solving, and time and accuracy monitoring (Legg & Locker, 2009). 
 Furthermore, not only did an overconfidence effect emerge, but this tendency was 
reflected across different domains. Demonstrating generality in miscalibration across a diverse 
set of tasks is a novel and central contribution. Framing calibration as a person, rather than task-
centred ability has direct implications for future interventions. Psychological and person-related 
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traits are usually thought of as developing in childhood and remaining somewhat fixed over time, 
becoming more resistant to intervention as a function of age. Given that metacognitive skills 
appear between the ages of eight and ten (Veenman et al., 2006), metacognitive training may be 
most beneficial during middle and late childhood, in order to support the development of 
emerging monitoring skills. An aim of future research should be to examine the effects of 
metacognitive training in reducing bias and whether this reduction in bias transfers to other 
domains. If calibration is domain-general, then it would be expected that metacognitive training 
can lead to calibration improvements across tasks.  
Beyond targeting improved confidence, another training and intervention implication of 
the current study is that resolution should also be supported. The ability to discriminate between 
hits and misses is just as important to monitoring accuracy as is the ability to judge overall 
performance and should also be developed for efficient decision-making. Current findings 
showed that within the same task, successful calibration was not correlated with good resolution, 
suggesting that improvements in overconfidence would not necessarily lead to improvements in 
discrimination. This distinction is of importance, as it is not sufficient to accurately judge, for 
example, one’s ability in financial literacy, but to also be able to distinguish between elements 
within that same domain that are more or less skilled. For example, an individual may be adept at 
interest rate calculations, yet less knowledgeable in mortgages. This individual’s overall 
confidence in financial skills may therefore prevent them from seeking external support and 
advice, despite poor mortgage-related knowledge. Compared to calibration, there is much less 
research on ways to improve resolution through metacognitive training. One study by Koriat and 
colleagues (2002) did demonstrate that, in contrast to overconfidence, resolution abilities 
actually improved with repeated practice. This finding can be best understood within the context 
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of domain-specificity, such that as individuals accumulate greater content knowledge, 
performance in that domain also increases. A potential intervention pathway for discrimination 
would therefore be to increase exposure to domain knowledge and to provide ongoing feedback 
on performance, thus sensitizing individuals to aspects of content-related knowledge that have 
been more or less internalized. Thus, in contrast to calibration that can be supported as a 
generalized trait, findings from the present study suggest that resolution abilities are domain-
specific and would require domain-specific interventions in order to help individuals better 
discriminate between correct and incorrect responses.  
Education. The current study purposefully chose to examine mathematical decision-
making when selecting which domains to compare to the more established area of general 
knowledge. Not only do mathematics represent an important academic domain in education, but 
mathematical skills have direct implications in real-world type problems, such as financial 
literacy (Chen & Volpe, 1998) and the use of probabilistic thinking in everyday decision-making 
(Gigerenzer et al, 2007).  
Although understanding individual differences in math performance has been 
investigated in the literature, math has usually been explored in relation to anxiety (Erikson & 
Heit, 2015; Morsanyi et al., 2019). Exploring math from a metacognitive framework can provide 
a different narrative of why, beyond differences in actual computational knowledge and abilities, 
some individuals are more mathematically competent that others. As such, a novel contribution 
of this study is that it provides an empirical method for exploring how internal criteria, such as 
confidence judgments and the various meta-level processes described in Ackerman and 
Thompson’s (2017) model, can help individuals monitor and adjust their mathematical 
performance.  
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Considering described differences between calibration and resolution, distinct 
intervention targets would be required to help support overall monitoring of math performance. 
Due to the domain-generality of overconfidence, increased training in math-related content may 
not necessarily lead to better performance calibration. Some studies have actually shown that 
interventions directly targeting financial literacy have led to only small improvements in 
financial competency, and that such improvements decayed over time (Fernandes, Lynch, & 
Netemeyer, 2014). Thus, another method for approaching mathematical competence can be 
based on how individuals engage in and adjust performance, based on their subjective confidence 
ratings. In the current study, confidence was related to performance, across all tasks. Similarly, 
Stankov, Morony, and Lee (2012) demonstrated that compared to other self-constructs of self-
efficacy, self-concept, and anxiety, confidence emerged as the best non-cognitive predictor of 
academic achievement. A study by Jacobse and Harskamp (2012) also found that monitoring 
accuracy explained 16 to 36% of the variance in mathematics achievement. Thus, increased 
awareness of the accuracy of internal judgments of performance may be vital to supporting math 
engagement and performance.  
In contrast, the domain-specificity of resolution abilities suggests that to better aid 
learners in discriminating between correct versus incorrect responses, increased computational 
and financial literacy exposure would be required. That is, increased mathematical knowledge 
would lead to better discrimination between concepts that are more or less known. Given these 
differences between calibration and resolution, it is going to be of importance to delineate what 
are individuals’ specific areas of need, when targeting math performance. That is, is the learner 
biased and overconfident in their computational abilities? Or, are they able to appropriately gage 
their abilities, yet have difficulty discriminating between what is more or less understood? Or 
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rather, is it some combination of the two? A better understanding of which metric of 
metacognition accuracy is compromised can then lead to tailored intervention targets and 
improved metacognitive training, directly supporting areas of metacognitive monitoring that are 
in need.  
Overall, the general educational implication of this current study is that to promote better 
correspondence between learner’s perceptions of math performance and their actual 
performance, general metacognitive training targeted at increasing awareness of subjective 
monitoring states is of importance. Research has generally found that the ability to solve 
mathematical problems improves with the use of metacognitive training (e.g., Jacobse & 
Harskamp, 2012), further supporting the need to integrate confidence awareness and monitoring 
when targeting mathematical performance.  
 
Future directions. Considering the novelty of this research and that the primary goal was 
to provide empirical evidence that questions of domain-generality and specificity can be 
experimentally explored, there are many ways in which current findings can be built upon and 
refined.   
First, given the preliminary nature of the current study’s findings on metacognitive 
monitoring across different domains, further replication will be critical to extend our 
understanding of the involved processing and metacognitive mechanisms and their relative 
contributions throughout processing stages (Ackerman &Thompson, 2017). 
Second, described methodological issues relating to both cross-domain and cross-index 
comparisons, such as considerations of performance variability and task difficulty, should be 
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empirically explored in future studies. A better understanding of how task format and exposure 
can impact indices of monitoring accuracy is also warranted.    
Third, to help understand how to best support the emergence of monitoring accuracy 
abilities, future research grounded in a developmental perspective would be of value. In 
particular, given that calibration demonstrates domain-generality and can be likened to a trait-
based ability, an in-depth understanding of the overconfidence bias in children and whether such 
a bias improves with early intervention and metacognitive training would be of value.   
Fourth, proposed theoretical implications of this study should be further tested and 
explored. The current study largely focused on the middle column of Ackerman & Thompson’s 
(2017) Meta-Reasoning framework model; a step further would be to empirically test how 
monitoring accuracy indexes subsequently relate and impact the right column of the model, 
which represent processes of metacognitive control.  
Last, study implications suggest that poor calibration and resolution require different 
channels of intervention. It would be of importance to empirically test these hypotheses and 
whether the suggested domain-general versus domain-specific interventions lead to expected 
improvements in corresponding accuracy indices.  
Concluding Remarks 
The purpose of the current study was to extend the study of calibration and resolution to 
diverse every day domains, where people must make implicit judgments about their accuracy 
before deciding on an action. In addition to general knowledge, financial and probability 
calculations were specifically selected, given the relevance of these domains for personal 
financial management (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2014) and the fact that we are presented with 
probability information in so many facets of our lives (Gigerenzer, Gaissmaier, Kurz-Milcke, 
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Schwartz, & Woloshin, 2007). Overall, more consistency was found across tasks in predicting 
calibration than in predicting resolution. The degree of domain generality has practical 
implications for learning, education, and other applications based on monitoring accuracy, like 
medical and financial decisions. The findings highlight the critical difference between 
monitoring indices, such that a pivotal implication of this study is that calibration and resolution 
represent distinct and separable measures of monitoring accuracy, both of importance for 
effective monitoring and subsequent effort regulation. To our knowledge, this is the first study to 
explore resolution across a diverse set of domains and this distinction between both these levels 
of monitoring accuracy is of great importance. From the perspective of trainability, different 
interventions may be required for each index and across domains. If resolution indices are more 
sensitive to domain differences, training of unique aspects of a domain may be more likely to 
positively impact this index. However, given the generality of the overconfidence index, it is 
worth considering intervention strategies that might facilitate better calibration across domains. 
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APPENDIX A: 
DEMOGRAPHICS FORM 
 
Demographic Information 
 
Age:  _______ 
 
Gender:  
___ Male 
___ Female 
___ Other  
 
_Year in University:  
___ 1st year undergrad 
___ 2nd year undergrad 
___ 3rd year undergrad 
___ 4th year undergrad 
___ 5th year undergrad 
___ Post-BA Continuing 
___ Other 
 
Please indicate your ethnicity (Check one) 
 ___White/European 
___ Black 
___Asian 
___Aboriginal 
___South-Asian 
___Arab 
___ Latino-Hispanic 
___ Other  (please specify)_______________ 
 
Is English your first language? ___Yes  ___ No 
If No, how long have you been speaking English?    
___________ Years  
 
 
 
Financially, do you consider your family to be: 
___Well below average income 
___Below average income 
___Average income 
___Above average income 
___Well above average income 
 
Current academic average grade: 
___Below 49% 
___50 – 59% 
___60 – 69% 
___70 – 79% 
___80 – 100% 
 
Overall, do you think that you have difficulties in 
one or more of the following areas: emotions, 
behavior or being able to get along with other 
people?  
____No 
____Yes – minor difficulties 
____Yes – definite difficulties 
____Yes – severe difficulties  
 
Overall, do you think that you have difficulties in 
learning or academics? 
____No 
____Yes – minor difficulties 
____Yes – definite difficulties 
____Yes – severe difficulties
 Mother Father 
Less than 7th Grade   
Junior high / Middle school (9th grade)   
Partial high school (10th or 11th grade)   
High school graduate   
Partial college/university (at least one year)   
College/university education   
Graduate/professional degree   
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APPENDIX B: 
EXPERIMENTAL TASKS PILOT DATA 
 
General Knowledge Test 
 
Item Correct Response Success Rate (%) 
1. What is the longest river in South America? Amazon 63.16 
2. For which country is the yen the monetary unit? Japan 57.89 
3. What is the last name of the man who first studied 
genetic inheritance in plants? 
Mendel 52.63 
4. What is the proper name for a badminton bird? Shuttlecock 36.84 
5. What is the last name of the author who wrote 
“Oliver Twist”? 
Dickens 63.16 
6. What is the last name of the man who invented the 
phonograph?  
Edison 33.33 
7. What is the name of an inability to sleep? Insomnia 94.74 
8. What is the name of the lizard that changes its colour 
to match the surroundings? 
Chameleon 100 
9. What is the name of the largest ocean on earth?  Pacific 36.84 
10. What is the capital of Australia? Canberra 26.32 
11. What animal runs the fastest? Cheetah 100 
12. What is the term for hitting a volleyball down hard 
into the opponents court? 
Spike 89.47 
13. What is the name of the brightest star in the sky 
excluding the sun? 
Sirius 52.63 
14. What is the name of a dried grape?  Raisin 84.21 
15. What is the name of the largest desert on earth? Antarctica 5.26 
16. What is the name of the mountain range that 
separates Asia from Europe? 
Ural 15.79 
17. What is the name for a medical doctor who 
specializes in diseases of the skin? 
Dermatologist 47.37 
18. What is the unit of sound intensity? Decibel 63.16 
19. What is the name of deer meat? Venison 57.89 
20. What is the name of the organ that produces 
insulin? 
Pancreas 68.42 
21. What is the name of the automobile instrument that 
measures mileage? 
Odometer 63.16 
22. What is the name of the bird that cannot fly and is 
the largest bird on earth? 
Ostrich 94.74 
23. What is the name for a cyclone that occurs over 
land? 
Tornado 78.95 
24. What is the largest planet in the solar system? Jupiter 63.16 
Note. N = 18; Total success rate = 60.38% 
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Financial Calculation Test 
 
Item Correct Response Success Rate 
(%) 
1. Imagine you are planning a trip to the USA, and the current 
exchange rate is $1 Canadian dollar = $0.75 US dollars. That 
is, for every Canadian dollar, you will receive 75 cents in US 
funds. If you have $50 Canadian to spend, how much will you 
get in US dollars?  
$37.50 US 89.47 
2. Janice has a job where she earns $2000 per month. She 
spends $900 for rent and $150 for groceries each month. She 
also spends $250 per month on transportation. If she budgets 
$100 each month for clothing, $200 for restaurants and $250 
for everything else, how long will it take her to save $750?  
5 months 89.47 
3. Marlon decided to buy a new couch for his apartment. He 
bought a new couch for $800 and used his credit to pay for 
this purchase. His credit card charges a 26% annual interest 
rate and Marlon expects that after his bill arrives, he won’t be 
able to pay for any of his balance and he will need an 
additional 12 months to pay for his new couch. How much 
will his monthly payment be for his new couch?  
$84.00 63.16 
4. Which of the following is a correct calculation of simple 
interest on $1000 at the end of one year?  
4% = $40 or $1040 73.68 
5. Imagine you are planning a trip to Mexico where Mexican 
Pesos are the currency, and the current exchange rate is $1 
Canadian dollar = 16 Mexican pesos. That is, for every 
Canadian dollar, you will receive 16 Mexican pesos. If you 
have $25 Canadian to spend, how much will you get in 
Mexican pesos? 
400 Mexican pesos 100 
6. If Frederick deposits 25% of $130 into a savings account, 
what is the amount of his deposit?  
$32.50 84.21 
7. Stefan bought a used car. The car cost $12000, and he put a 
$7000 deposit on it from his savings. He put the remainder on 
his credit card. His credit card charges a 21% annual interest 
rate and Stefan expects that after his bill arrives, he won’t be 
able to pay for any of his balance and he will need an 
additional 12 months to pay for his car. How much interest 
total interest will he pay for his car?  
$1050 78.95 
8. If Bilal gets a simple interest rate of 2.6% on his savings 
account, how much interest will he receive on $5000 that he 
has had in the bank for a year?  
$130 89.47 
9. Imagine you are planning a trip to Switzerland where Euros 
are the currency, and the current exchange rate is $1 Canadian 
140 Euros 100 
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dollar = $0.70 Euros. That is, for every Canadian dollar, you 
will receive 70 cents in Euros. If you have $200 Canadian to 
spend, how much will you get in US dollars?  
10. Drummond is trying to figure out if he will need to get a 
part-time job over the school year. He has gotten a student 
loan for $15000 this year for 12 months. His rent is $850 per 
month, his grocery bill is $200 per month, his cell phone bill 
is $55 per month, and his transit pass is $120 per month. He 
expects to need $250 per month for additional expenses. 
Which of the following situations will Drummond be in?  
Drummond will 
have to earn $225 
each month in a 
part-time job 
68.42 
11. Sonja unexpected had to get a new muffler and brakes for 
her car. The total cost was $1500. She used her credit to pay 
for this purchase. Her credit card charges a 19% annual 
interest rate and Sonja expects that after her bill arrives, she 
won’t be able to pay for any of her balance and she will need 
an additional 12 months to pay for this expense. How much 
will her monthly payment be?  
$148.75 63.16 
12. Bank A provides 0.5% interest for the first year in a 
savings account and 3.9% in the second year. Bank B 
provides an interest rate of 1.9% for savings accounts. 
Mohamed has $5000 and he decides to put his money into 
Bank B for the first year and then transfer his money into 
Bank A for the second year. If he uses this strategy, how 
much money will he have after 2 years?  
$5220.98 72.22 
13. Imagine you are planning a trip to Brazil, and the current 
exchange rate is $1 Canadian dollar = 2.37 Brazilian Reals. 
That is, for every Canadian dollar, you will receive 2.37 
Brazilian Reals. If you have $1000 Canadian to spend, how 
much will you get in Brazilian Reals?  
2370 Brazilian 
Reals 
89.47 
14. If Lena withdraws 35% of the $4000 that she has in her 
savings account, how much money did she withdraw?  
$1400 94.74 
15. Raman decided to take a business training year abroad in 
India. The cost of this training opportunity was $9500. She 
used her credit card to pay for this opportunity. Her credit 
card charges a 20% annual interest rate and Raman expects 
that after her bill arrives, she won’t be able to pay for any of 
her balance and she will need an additional 12 months to pay 
for her training opportunity. How much total interest will she 
pay for this opportunity?  
$1900 94.74 
16. Denoja had $5000 saved up in her bank account. After one 
year, she got 2.0% interest on this money. She then took out 
$1000 to buy some books. She saved the rest of her money in 
this account for another year at the same interest rate. How 
much money did she have after 2 years?  
$4182 89.47 
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17. Imagine you are planning a trip to Costa Rica where Costa 
Rican Colons are the currency, and the current exchange rate 
is $1 Canadian dollar = 140 Costa Rican Colons. That is, for 
every Canadian dollar, you will receive 140 Costa Rican 
Colons. If you have $20 Canadian to spend, how much will 
you get in Costa Rican Colons?  
2800 Costa Rican 
Colons 
84.21 
18. For his first year, Noel’s parents provided him with 
$25000 to cover his university expenses. After paying $7200 
for his tuition, $12000 for his residence, how much will Noel 
have left over to spend each month if he must budget for 8 
months? 
$725 89.47 
19. Dana used her credit card to pay $875 for her books. Her 
credit card charges a 22% annual interest rate and Dana 
expects that after her bill arrives, she won’t be able to pay for 
any of her balance and she will need an additional 12 months 
to pay for her books. How much total interest will she pay for 
her books?  
$192.50 89.47 
20. Dina inherited $2500 from her grandmother. Dina wants 
to save this money for university, and she has put it into 
savings account for two years. She will receive an annual 
interest rate of 3.5%. How much will her money be worth in 
two years?  
$2678.06 73.68 
21. Imagine you and your partner are planning a trip to 
Vietnam, and the current exchange rate is $1 Canadian dollar 
= $1750 Vietnamese Dong. That is, for every Canadian dollar, 
you will receive 1750 Vietnamese Dong. If you have $200 
Canadian to spend, how much will you get in Vietnamese 
Dongs  
350000 
Vietnamese Dong 
78.95 
22. Maika has two jobs. She earns $400 a week at her first job 
and $600 a month at her second job. Each month, she spends 
$1000 for rent, $200 for groceries, $125 on transportation, and 
$75 on her cell phone. If she budgets $200 each month for 
spending and $125 for clothing, how long will it take her to 
save $950?  
2 months 73.68 
23. Grant decided to get a new laptop for school. He bought a 
new MacBook for $1600 and used his credit to pay for this 
purchase. His credit card charges a 22% annual interest rate 
and Grant expects that after his bill arrives, he won’t be able 
to pay for any of his balance and he will need an additional 12 
months to pay for his new laptop. How much will his monthly 
payment be for his new laptop?  
$162.67 63.16 
24. Which of the following is a correct calculation of simple 
interest on $2000 at the end of one year?  
3% = $30 or $2030 78.95 
Note. N = 18; Total success rate = 82.18% 
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Probability Calculation Test 
 
Item Correct Response Success Rate (%) 
1. Which of the following represents the biggest risk for 
getting a disease? 
1 in 10 100 
2. If you flipped a fair coin three times, what is the 
probability that it will land “heads” on all three flips? 
12.5% 72.22 
3. Treatments W, X, Y and Z have the same effects. […] 
Which treatment will most likely cause headaches? 
Treatment Z 88.89 
4. A six-sided die has an odd number on three sides (1, 3, 
5) and an even number on three sides (2, 4, 6). Imagine 
that the die is rolled 100 times. Out of 100 rolls, how 
many times do you think the die would come up as an 
even number (2, 4, or 6)? 
50 times 83.33 
5. If there are 5 red, 3 green and 2 yellow marbles in a 
paper bag, what are the chances of choosing a green 
marble? 
30% 94.44 
6. Which player is most likely to score a goal in hockey? Player C who 
scores 31% of the 
shots on net 
77.78 
7. A chance of miscarriage is approximately 15% during 
the first 20 weeks of pregnancy. Drug use can triple the 
incidence of miscarriage during this time. If a pregnant 
woman uses drugs during her first 20 weeks, what chance 
does she have of having a miscarriage? 
45%* 77.78 
8. The chances that a sewing machine will break the 
thread in a clothing factory is 12%. Out of the 6000 
clothing items produced in one day, how many items will 
be affected by the broken thread? 
720 clothing items 83.33 
9. Which of the following represents the best chance for 
winning the lottery? 
4/10 66.67 
10. There are currently four main products available to 
stimulate hair growth products for middle-aged men. 
Sam wants to select the product that will give him the 
best outcome. Which product should he select? 
Product IV has a 4 
out of 20 chance of 
a positive outcome 
in 6 weeks. 
 
83.33 
11. If you flipped two fair coins at the same time, what is 
the probability that they both come up tails? 
33% 77.78 
12. A six-sided die has an odd number on three sides (1, 
3, 5) and an even number on three sides (2, 4, 6). Imagine 
that the die is rolled. What is the probability of getting a 
3 or a 5 on your throw?   
 
 
33% 
 
 
88.89 
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13. Which of the following represents the lowest risk for 
getting a disease? 
1 in 100 94.44 
14. A bag contains 2 red, 3 green and 2 blue balls. Two 
balls are drawn at random. What is the probability that 
none of the balls drawn is blue? 
5/7 61.11 
15. If 4 people out of 10000 ticket holders wins a prize, 
what is the probability of winning a prize? 
0.0004% 55.56 
16. Which of the following represents the biggest risk for 
getting a disease? 
1 in 5 94.44 
17. A six-sided die has an odd number on three sides (1, 
3, 5) and an even number on three sides (2, 4, 6). Imagine 
that two dice are rolled. What is the likelihood that the 
dice will both land on a one? 
1/36 55.56 
18. Imagine that you a fair coin three times. What is the 
probability that it will come up “heads” on the fourth toss 
50% 77.78 
19. Which of the following represents the lowest risk for 
getting a disease? 
431 in 10000 72.22 
20. The risk of a heart attack is about 9 in 100 people. 
Taking aspirin can reduce the risk of a heart attack by 
two-thirds. What are the chances of getting a heart attack 
if you take aspirin? 
3% 66.67 
21. Your family tells you that there is between a 1/100 to 
a 1/5 chance that your prescription will cause hives. 
What is the probability range that you will get hives from 
your prescription? 
1% to 20% 61.11 
22. There are four new stain removers for rugs available 
on the market. Nelson wants to select the product that 
will give him the best outcome on his stained rugs. 
Which product should he select? 
Product I has a 4 
out of 25 chance of 
removing the stain 
 
72.22 
23. If 386 people out of every 100000 get a disease, what 
is the probability of getting this disease? 
0.00386% 38.89 
24. A six-sided die has an odd number on three sides (1, 
3, 5) and an even number on three sides (2, 4, 6). What is 
the probability of getting a sum 9 from two throws of a 
dice? 
1/9 61.11 
Note. N = 18; Total success rate = 71.06% 
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APPENDIX C: 
EXPERIMENTAL TASKS STUDY DATA 
 
General Knowledge Test 
Item Correct 
Response 
Success 
Rate (%) 
Mean 
Confidence 
1. What is the longest river in South America? Amazon 54.4 61% 
2. For which country is the yen the monetary unit? Japan 37.5 71% 
3. What is the last name of the man who first 
studied genetic inheritance in plants? 
Mendel 59.6 71% 
4. What is the proper name for a badminton bird? Shuttlecock 34.6 81% 
5. What is the last name of the author who wrote 
“Oliver Twist”? 
Dickens 46.3 54% 
6. What is the last name of the man who invented 
the phonograph?  
Edison 25.7 57% 
7. What is the name of an inability to sleep?a Insomnia 91.2 92% 
8. What is the name of the lizard that changes its 
colour to match the surroundings? a 
Chameleon 96.3 94% 
9. What is the name of the largest ocean on earth?  Pacific 58.8 76% 
10. What is the capital of Australia? a Canberra 9.6 77% 
11. What animal runs the fastest? a Cheetah 94.9 92% 
12. What is the term for hitting a volleyball down 
hard into the opponents court? a 
Spike 93.4 88% 
13. What is the name of the brightest star in the 
sky excluding the sun? ** 
Sirius 19.4 68% 
14. What is the name of a dried grape? ** Raisin 87.8 91% 
15. What is the name of the largest desert on 
earth? a 
Antarctica 3.7 80% 
16. What is the name of the mountain range that 
separates Asia from Europe? a 
Ural 6.6 63% 
17. What is the name for a medical doctor who 
specializes in diseases of the skin? a 
Dermatologist 94.9 94% 
18. What is the unit of sound intensity? Decibel 54.4 79% 
19. What is the name of deer meat? Venison 47.1 61% 
20. What is the name of the organ that produces 
insulin? 
Pancreas 68.4 73% 
21. What is the name of the automobile instrument 
that measures mileage? 
Odometer 40.4 76% 
22. What is the name of the bird that cannot fly 
and is the largest bird on earth? 
Ostrich 86.0 88% 
23. What is the name for a cyclone that occurs 
over land? 
Tornado 75.0 79% 
24. What is the largest planet in the solar system? Jupiter 51.5 74% 
Note. N = 136; ** N = 98; Total success rate = 53.19% 
aItem removed due to overall success of less than 10% or greater than 90%. 
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Financial Calculation Test 
 
Item Correct 
Response 
Success 
Rate (%) 
Mean 
Confidence 
1. Imagine you are planning a trip to the USA, and the 
current exchange rate is $1 Canadian dollar = $0.75 US 
dollars. That is, for every Canadian dollar, you will 
receive 75 cents in US funds. If you have $50 
Canadian to spend, how much will you get in US 
dollars? a 
$37.50 US 91.2 92% 
2. Janice has a job where she earns $2000 per month. 
She spends $900 for rent and $150 for groceries each 
month. She also spends $250 per month on 
transportation. If she budgets $100 each month for 
clothing, $200 for restaurants and $250 for everything 
else, how long will it take her to save $750?  
5 months 72.1 86% 
3. Marlon decided to buy a new couch for his 
apartment. He bought a new couch for $800 and used 
his credit to pay for this purchase. His credit card 
charges a 26% annual interest rate and Marlon expects 
that after his bill arrives, he won’t be able to pay for 
any of his balance and he will need an additional 12 
months to pay for his new couch. How much will his 
monthly payment be for his new couch?  
$84.00 39.0 76% 
4. Which of the following is a correct calculation of 
simple interest on $1000 at the end of one year?  
4% = $40 
or $1040 
54.4 59% 
5. Imagine you are planning a trip to Mexico where 
Mexican Pesos are the currency, and the current 
exchange rate is $1 Canadian dollar = 16 Mexican 
pesos. That is, for every Canadian dollar, you will 
receive 16 Mexican pesos. If you have $25 Canadian to 
spend, how much will you get in Mexican pesos? a 
400 
Mexican 
pesos 
94.9 91% 
6. If Frederick deposits 25% of $130 into a savings 
account, what is the amount of his deposit?  
$32.50 85.3 89% 
7. Stefan bought a used car. The car cost $12000, and 
he put a $7000 deposit on it from his savings. He put 
the remainder on his credit card. His credit card 
charges a 21% annual interest rate and Stefan expects 
that after his bill arrives, he won’t be able to pay for 
any of his balance and he will need an additional 12 
months to pay for his car. How much interest total 
interest will he pay for his car?  
$1050 70.6 72% 
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8. If Bilal gets a simple interest rate of 2.6% on his 
savings account, how much interest will he receive on 
$5000 that he has had in the bank for a year?  
$130 64.7 73% 
9. Imagine you are planning a trip to Switzerland 
where Euros are the currency, and the current 
exchange rate is $1 Canadian dollar = $0.70 Euros. 
That is, for every Canadian dollar, you will receive 70 
cents in Euros. If you have $200 Canadian to spend, 
how much will you get in US dollars? a 
140 Euros 91.9 89% 
10. Drummond is trying to figure out if he will need to 
get a part-time job over the school year. He has gotten 
a student loan for $15000 this year for 12 months. His 
rent is $850 per month, his grocery bill is $200 per 
month, his cell phone bill is $55 per month, and his 
transit pass is $120 per month. He expects to need 
$250 per month for additional expenses. Which of the 
following situations will Drummond be in?  
Drummond 
will have 
to earn 
$225 each 
month in a 
part-time 
job 
65.4 73% 
11. Sonja unexpected had to get a new muffler and 
brakes for her car. The total cost was $1500. She used 
her credit to pay for this purchase. Her credit card 
charges a 19% annual interest rate and Sonja expects 
that after her bill arrives, she won’t be able to pay for 
any of her balance and she will need an additional 12 
months to pay for this expense. How much will her 
monthly payment be?  
$148.75 51.5 72% 
12. Bank A provides 0.5% interest for the first year in 
a savings account and 3.9% in the second year. Bank B 
provides an interest rate of 1.9% for savings accounts. 
Mohamed has $5000 and he decides to put his money 
into Bank B for the first year and then transfer his 
money into Bank A for the second year. If he uses this 
strategy, how much money will he have after 2 years?  
$5220.98 50.0 55% 
13. Imagine you are planning a trip to Brazil, and the 
current exchange rate is $1 Canadian dollar = 2.37 
Brazilian Reals. That is, for every Canadian dollar, you 
will receive 2.37 Brazilian Reals. If you have $1000 
Canadian to spend, how much will you get in Brazilian 
Reals? a 
2370 
Brazilian 
Reals 
91.2 87% 
14. If Lena withdraws 35% of the $4000 that she has in 
her savings account, how much money did she 
withdraw? a  
$1400 93.4 86% 
15. Raman decided to take a business training year 
abroad in India. The cost of this training opportunity 
was $9500. She used her credit card to pay for this 
$1900 77.2 73% 
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opportunity. Her credit card charges a 20% annual 
interest rate and Raman expects that after her bill 
arrives, she won’t be able to pay for any of her balance 
and she will need an additional 12 months to pay for 
her training opportunity. How much total interest will 
she pay for this opportunity?  
16. Denoja had $5000 saved up in her bank account. 
After one year, she got 2.0% interest on this money. 
She then took out $1000 to buy some books. She saved 
the rest of her money in this account for another year at 
the same interest rate. How much money did she have 
after 2 years?  
$4182 58.8 66% 
17. Imagine you are planning a trip to Costa Rica 
where Costa Rican Colons are the currency, and the 
current exchange rate is $1 Canadian dollar = 140 
Costa Rican Colons. That is, for every Canadian dollar, 
you will receive 140 Costa Rican Colons. If you have 
$20 Canadian to spend, how much will you get in 
Costa Rican Colons? a 
2800 Costa 
Rican 
Colons 
91.2 89% 
18. For his first year, Noel’s parents provided him with 
$25000 to cover his university expenses. After paying 
$7200 for his tuition, $12000 for his residence, how 
much will Noel have left over to spend each month if 
he must budget for 8 months? 
$725 84.6 85% 
19. Dana used her credit card to pay $875 for her 
books. Her credit card charges a 22% annual interest 
rate and Dana expects that after her bill arrives, she 
won’t be able to pay for any of her balance and she 
will need an additional 12 months to pay for her books. 
How much total interest will she pay for her books?  
$192.50 68.4 77% 
20. Dina inherited $2500 from her grandmother. Dina 
wants to save this money for university, and she has 
put it into savings account for two years. She will 
receive an annual interest rate of 3.5%. How much will 
her money be worth in two years?  
$2678.06 51.5 70% 
21. Imagine you and your partner are planning a trip to 
Vietnam, and the current exchange rate is $1 Canadian 
dollar = $1750 Vietnamese Dong. That is, for every 
Canadian dollar, you will receive 1750 Vietnamese 
Dong. If you have $200 Canadian to spend, how much 
will you get in Vietnamese Dongs  
350000 
Vietnamese 
Dong 
85.3 88% 
22. Maika has two jobs. She earns $400 a week at her 
first job and $600 a month at her second job. Each 
month, she spends $1000 for rent, $200 for groceries, 
2 months 69.9 78% 
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$125 on transportation, and $75 on her cell phone. If 
she budgets $200 each month for spending and $125 
for clothing, how long will it take her to save $950?  
23. Grant decided to get a new laptop for school. He 
bought a new MacBook for $1600 and used his credit 
to pay for this purchase. His credit card charges a 22% 
annual interest rate and Grant expects that after his bill 
arrives, he won’t be able to pay for any of his balance 
and he will need an additional 12 months to pay for his 
new laptop. How much will his monthly payment be 
for his new laptop?  
$162.67 52.9 75% 
24. Which of the following is a correct calculation of 
simple interest on $2000 at the end of one year?  
3% = $30 
or $2030 
61.8 63% 
Note. N = 136; Total success rate = 62.99%. 
a Item removed due to overall success rate of less than 10% or greater than 90%. 
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Probability Calculation Test 
 
Item Correct 
Response 
Success 
Rate (%) 
Mean 
Confidence 
1. Which of the following represents the biggest 
risk for getting a disease? a 
1 in 10 91.2 90% 
2. If you flipped a fair coin three times, what is 
the probability that it will land “heads” on all 
three flips? 
12.5% 43.4 68% 
3. Treatments W, X, Y and Z have the same 
effects. […] Which treatment will most likely 
cause headaches? 
Treatment Z 77.9 86% 
4. A six-sided die has an odd number on three 
sides (1, 3, 5) and an even number on three sides 
(2, 4, 6). Imagine that the die is rolled 100 times. 
Out of 100 rolls, how many times do you think 
the die would come up as an even number (2, 4, or 
6)? 
50 times 87.5 76% 
5. If there are 5 red, 3 green and 2 yellow marbles 
in a paper bag, what are the chances of choosing a 
green marble? a 
30% 90.4 83% 
6. Which player is most likely to score a goal in 
hockey? 
Player C who 
scores 31% of 
the shots on net 
69.9 79% 
7. A chance of miscarriage is approximately 15% 
during the first 20 weeks of pregnancy. Drug use 
can triple the incidence of miscarriage during this 
time. If a pregnant woman uses drugs during her 
first 20 weeks, what chance does she have of 
having a miscarriage? 
45% 73.5 83% 
8. The chances that a sewing machine will break 
the thread in a clothing factory is 12%. Out of the 
6000 clothing items produced in one day, how 
many items will be affected by the broken thread? 
720 clothing 
items 
69.9 78% 
9 Which of the following represents the best 
chance for winning the lottery? 
4/10 50.7 76% 
10. There are currently four main products 
available to stimulate hair growth products for 
middle-aged men. Sam wants to select the product 
that will give him the best outcome. Which 
product should he select? 
Product IV has a 
4 out of 20 
chance of a 
positive 
outcome in 6 
weeks. 
 
67.6 78% 
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11. If you flipped two fair coins at the same time, 
what is the probability that they both come up 
tails? 
33% 70.6 64% 
12. A six-sided die has an odd number on three 
sides (1, 3, 5) and an even number on three sides 
(2, 4, 6). Imagine that the die is rolled. What is the 
probability of getting a 3 or a 5 on your throw?   
33% 
 
 
62.5 71% 
13. Which of the following represents the lowest 
risk for getting a disease? a 
1 in 100 90.4 91% 
14. A bag contains 2 red, 3 green and 2 blue balls. 
Two balls are drawn at random. What is the 
probability that none of the balls drawn is blue? 
5/7 48.5 72% 
15. If 4 people out of 10000 ticket holders wins a 
prize, what is the probability of winning a prize? 
0.0004% 55.9 80% 
16. Which of the following represents the biggest 
risk for getting a disease? 
1 in 5 72.8 81% 
17. A six-sided die has an odd number on three 
sides (1, 3, 5) and an even number on three sides 
(2, 4, 6). Imagine that two dice are rolled. What is 
the likelihood that the dice will both land on a 
one? 
1/36 32.4 74% 
18. Imagine that you a fair coin three times. What 
is the probability that it will come up “heads” on 
the fourth toss 
50% 47.8 73% 
19. Which of the following represents the lowest 
risk for getting a disease? 
431 in 10000 66.9 79% 
20. The risk of a heart attack is about 9 in 100 
people. Taking aspirin can reduce the risk of a 
heart attack by two-thirds. What are the chances 
of getting a heart attack if you take aspirin? 
3% 47.8 71% 
21. Your family tells you that there is between a 
1/100 to a 1/5 chance that your prescription will 
cause hives. What is the probability range that you 
will get hives from your prescription? 
1% to 20% 41.9 79% 
22. There are four new stain removers for rugs 
available on the market. Nelson wants to select 
the product that will give him the best outcome on 
his stained rugs. Which product should he select? 
Product I has a 
4 out of 25 
chance of 
removing the 
stain 
65.4 76% 
23. If 386 people out of every 100000 get a 
disease, what is the probability of getting this 
disease? 
0.00386% 48.5 81% 
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24. A six-sided die has an odd number on three 
sides (1, 3, 5) and an even number on three sides 
(2, 4, 6). What is the probability of getting a sum 
9 from two throws of a dice? 
1/9 35.3 57% 
Note. N = 136; Total success rate = 58.89%. 
a Item removed due to overall success rate of less than 10% or greater than 90%.  
 
 
.  
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APPENDIX D: 
WORKING MEMORY TASK 
 
Instructions: 
You will see a sentence on the screen and hear it being said aloud.  Your job is to read the 
sentence out loud along with me, and then as soon as you have finished reading the sentence, 
decide if the sentence is True or False by checking off either True or False on your sheet of paper 
that you have in front of you.  
After we read some sentences, you will see a screen that says, “What was the last word in each 
sentence that you read from set #1, 2, 3 etc.”  When you see this screen, you will be prompted to 
write down the last word of each sentence that we read from that specific set of words.  Don’t 
worry about spelling!  
Please put your pencils down as soon as you have finished writing down the words. 
Let’s give it a try… 
Practice Question 
 
A)   Jackets have a zipper. 
TRUE      FALSE 
B)  Shoes go on your hand. 
TRUE      FALSE 
What was the last word in each sentence you read? Please put pencils down after writing down 
the words. 
___________________    ______________________ 
Let’s do some more.  
 
Set #1 
1) The sun rises in the morning. 
TRUE     FALSE  
2) Trees lose their leaves in spring. 
TRUE     FALSE 
What was the last word of each sentence you read for Set #1? 
 
 ____________________   ______________________   
 
Set #2 
1)   A race car is fast.  
TRUE     FALSE  
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 2)    Peas are vegetables.  
TRUE     FALSE 
What was the last word of each sentence you read for Set #2? 
____________________   ______________________  
 
Set #3 
1)   Dogs have six legs.  
TRUE     FALSE 
2)   Giraffes are tall.  
TRUE     FALSE 
What was the last word of each sentence you read for Set #3? 
____________________   ______________________ 
 
Set #4 
1)   Cars have four wheels.  
TRUE     FALSE 
2)   Cows eat meat. 
TRUE     FALSE 
3)   A red traffic light means “STOP”. 
TRUE     FALSE 
What was the last word of each sentence you read for Set #4? 
 ______________________        ________________________      _______________________ 
 
Set #5 
1)   Hens lay eggs.  
TRUE     FALSE 
2)   Elephants have purple spots. 
TRUE     FALSE 
 
3)   Stars are in the sky.  
TRUE     FALSE 
What was the last word of each sentence you read for Set #5? 
 ______________________        ________________________      _______________________ 
 
Set #6 
1)   Horses sleep in barns.  
TRUE     FALSE 
2)   Boiling water is hot. 
TRUE     FALSE 
3)   Strawberries are a fruit.  
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TRUE     FALSE 
What was the last word of each sentence you read for Set #6? 
______________________     ________________________      _____________________ 
 
Set #7 
1)   We get milk from cows.  
TRUE     FALSE 
2)  Plants need water to grow.  
TRUE     FALSE 
3)  It is warm in Winter.  
TRUE     FALSE 
4)  Carrots are orange.  
TRUE     FALSE 
What was the last word of each sentence you read for Set #7? 
______________________        ________________________      _______________________ 
______________________ 
 
Set #8 
1)  Birds have wings. 
TRUE     FALSE 
2)  Whales live in the ocean. 
TRUE     FALSE 
3)  An apple is a fruit.  
TRUE     FALSE 
4)  Fish swim in the sky.  
TRUE     FALSE 
What was the last word of each sentence you read for Set #8? 
_____________________        ________________________      ______________________ 
 _____________________   
 
Set #9 
1) A soccer ball is round.  
TRUE     FALSE 
2)  We sleep at night. 
TRUE     FALSE 
3)  Bees make honey.  
TRUE     FALSE 
4)  A feather is heavy.  
TRUE     FALSE 
What was the last word of each sentence you read for Set #9? 
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______________________        ________________________      ______________________ 
______________________ 
 
Set #10 
1)  Birds fly south for the Winter. 
TRUE     FALSE 
2) The earth travels around the sun.  
TRUE     FALSE 
3)  Purple is a colour.  
TRUE     FALSE 
4)  A car is a vegetable.  
TRUE     FALSE 
5)  Tadpoles become frogs.  
TRUE     FALSE 
What was the last word of each sentence you read for Set #10? 
 ______________________        ________________________     _______________________ 
 ______________________       _________________________ 
 
Set #11 
1)  Grass is green.  
TRUE     FALSE 
2)  Monkeys eat bananas. 
TRUE     FALSE 
3)  Pizza is a plant  
TRUE     FALSE 
4)  Ice is hot.  
TRUE     FALSE 
5)  Basketball is a sport.  
TRUE     FALSE 
What was the last word of each sentence you read for Set #11? 
______________________        ________________________   _________________________ 
______________________       _________________________ 
 
Set #12 
1)  Ants are insects.  
TRUE     FALSE 
2)  Lions live on farms.  
TRUE     FALSE 
3)  Dogs can bark.  
TRUE     FALSE 
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4)  Spiders have two legs.  
TRUE     FALSE 
5)  A beach has sand.  
TRUE     FALSE 
What was the last word of each sentence you read for Set #12? 
______________________        ________________________      ______________________ 
______________________       _________________________ 
 
 
 
